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A. INTRODUCTION
This is the third of such articles which we have written for the Journal ofLaw
and SocialPolicyl and it covers the period from September 1992 to September
1993. Each year the task seems to become more daunting. Events in the areas
of poverty law which we regularly survey have moved so quickly that what at
one time seemed an issue of great importance is likely to have been displaced
by two other issues of equal importance. While poverty law advocates struggle
to contain each such brush fire, the inferno rages all around.
The article will again focus on the income maintenance programs and related
issues most familiar to advocates in Ontario's community legal clinics.2 It has
also been expanded in scope to include an examination of housing issues as
they impact on the low income community. While every effort has been made
to be as inclusive as possible, limitations of space, time and our own expertise
mean that not every issue can receive the attention it might deserve. Omission
of any single item from the discussion below is no reflection upon its relative
importance.
In past years we have placed our analysis in the context of the economic
"restructuring" taking place, most notably in Ontario, but throughout the rest
of the country as well. This "restructuring" has invariably meant an increase in
unemployment for individuals and a corresponding increase in the numbers of
people living in poverty. The unemployment rate for 1992 was 11.3% (a 1%
increase over the previous year), and showed no signs of any decrease in the
near future.3 The number of families experiencing unemployment rose by over
8%.4 These figures have obvious implications for all social welfare programs.5
Most alarming is the continued incidence of child poverty. For example, it is
now estimated that one-third of the children living in Metropolitan Toronto
1. See R. Ellsworth and I. Morrison, "Poverty Law in Ontario: The Year in Review'
(1991), 7 J.L. & Social Pol'y 1 [hereinafter Ellsworth & Morrison (1991)], and R.
Ellsworth and I. Morrison, "Poverty Law in Ontario: The Year in Review" (1992), 8
J.L. & Social Pol'y 1 [hereinafter Ellsworth & Morrison (1992)].
2. These include social assistance, worker's compensation, unemployment insurance
and Canada Pension Plan benefits. Issues under the Charter of Rights and the
Human Rights Code which are relevant to poverty law practitioners will also be
canvassed. See Section E. The Constitution, Human Rights and Poverty Law,
infra.
3. Statistics Canada, "Social Indicators" Canada Social Trends, Autumn 1993 at 35. In
fact, popular political rhetoric has unemployment remaining unchanged for the rest
of the millennium.
4. Ibid.
5. For example, see the discussion of social assistance caseloads, infra.
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are living on welfare.6 These figures put the "debate" on social policy in this
country in a somewhat different perspective.
Unfortunately, the analysis must also take on political overtones. In the spring
of 1993, the Ontario government raised the income tax level and made it
retroactive to January 1, 1993. This meant that those Ontarians lucky enough
to have a job were required to pay the full year's tax increase over just six
months. Further, the government instituted its Expenditure Control Plan, the
effect of which was to reduce funding to many agencies serving the low
income community. Finally, the Social ContractAct, 19937 was passed in July
of 1993. The purpose of this Act was to reduce expenditures in the broader
public sector. This three-pronged initiative was meant to demonstrate the
government's serious efforts to reduce its deficit and its debt, while ensuring,
in good social democratic fashion, that the "burden" was shared by everyone.8
It would seem to weigh heavier on some than on others.
Our article must be viewed in this light, with reference to the law reform,
legislative and jurisprudential developments in the foreground, but against a
backdrop of continued economic insecurity for the poor and growing financial
pressure on poverty law activists and advocates.
B. POVERTY-DRAWING LINES, DRAWING CONCLUSIONS
Two reports on the state of poverty in Canada were released within a month of
one another. These were Towards 2000: Elininating Child Poverty9 and the
United Nations' Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights report on
Canada. 10
6. Social Planning Council of Metropolitan Toronto, "Child Poverty Crisis" (Septem-
ber 30, 1993).
7. S.O. 1993, c. 5.
8. While the legal clinic system was not affected by the Expenditure Control Plan,
legal clinic staff had to pay the increased income tax and were faced with a funding
cut imposed by the Social Contract Act, 1993. All this while dealing with an ever-
increasing demand on their services.
9. Canada, Report of the Standing Committee on Health and Welfare, Social Affairs,
Seniors and the Status of Women; Sub-Committee on Poverty, (June, 1993). [here-
inafter "Towards 2000"].
10. United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, consideration
of the Report submitted by Canada in accordance with articles 16 and 17 of the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, "Concluding
observations of the Committee" (May 27, 1993) [hereinafter "UN Report"].
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The premise of Towards 2000 was that "a major obstacle to eliminating
poverty lay with the lack of appropriate tools to correctly identify the problems
that make up poverty". 11 The report criticised the use of Statistics Canada's
Low Income Cut-Offs (LICO) as a poverty measure for many reasons; because
they do not represent a consistent measure of economic well-being, they
obscure the progress which has been made in reducing income inadequacy in
Canada and they do not properly take into account the effect of such things as
in-kind benefits or income taxes on poverty.12 In essence, Towards 2000
revisits the debate over absolute and relative poverty lines, and couches it in
the language of income inadequacy (absolute poverty) versus income inequal-
ity (relative poverty). Not surprisingly,13 the sub-committee comes down in
favour of developing some absolute measure of poverty. 14 It concludes that the
inability to properly identify those Canadians in need of assistance has reduced
the effectiveness of programs and initiatives designed to eliminate poverty in
Canada.
The UN Report provides a much starker (and perhaps more relevant)
picture of poverty in Canada. The Report expressed concern about the
persistence of poverty, stating that "there seems to have been no measur-
able progress in alleviating poverty in the last decade, nor in alleviating the
severity of poverty among a number of particularly vulnerable groups",
such as single mothers and children. 15 As well, the UN committee was
disturbed to learn that there was no procedure to ensure that welfare
payments provided an adequate level of income, that the federal govern-
ment had reduced its contributions under cost-sharing agreements for
social assistance, that the problems of hunger and homelessness did not
seem to be receiving appropriate government attention and that the courts
in Canada have held the right to security of the person contained in the
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms did not protect people from
social and economic deprivation or from infringements of their rights to
adequate food, clothing and housing. 16
11. Supra, note 9 at 1.
12. Ibid. at 2.
13. Opposition members of Parliament refused to participate in the proceedings of the
sub-committee, as did many policy groups and anti-poverty activists. Ibid., Appen-
dix C.
14. The sub-committee's recommendations are contained in Chapter V of Towards
2000, complete with numerical examples. A full critique of the approach outlined is
not possible in the context of this article.
15. Supra, note 10 at 3.
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At best, both these reports will probably serve as little other than rhetorical
ammunition. In truth, no matter how poverty is measured or defined, it does
exist in Canada. Its very existence means that the social welfare policies
designed to combat it have failed to achieve even a modest level of success.
For caseworkers dealing with this fact daily, the academic debate is meaningless.
C. DEVELOPMENTS IN INCOME MAINTENANCE LAw
1. Social Assistance
Once again, there was little good news for the increasing numbers of people
who have had to rely on social assistance for basic subsistence in Ontario. 17
While General Welfare caseloads finally appear to have peaked-a small
decline over the summer months of 1993 marked the first month over month
decline since July 198918 - they remain at record highs and Ontario con-
tinued to be hard pressed by federal downloading of the costs of social
assistance. 19
In brief, the past year saw a wide range of cuts and restrictions to social
assistance programs, few advances for the poor in the courts and proposed
welfare reforms which have made many activists and advocates very nervous
about the future of the "program of last resort", all of which has taken place in
the context of growing public hostility towards social spending generally and
social assistance specifically.
(a) Legislative Developments: The Expenditure Control Plan
In April 1993 Treasurer Floyd Laughren announced an "Expenditure Control
Plan", imposing budget cuts on almost all provincial Ministries and provincially
16. Ibid. at 3-4. For a discussion of the most recent court rulings on the Charter and
their implications for poor people, see Section E. The Constitution, Human
Rights and Poverty Law, infra.
17. According to provincial statistics, the total number of FB beneficiaries increased
from July 1992 to July 1993 by 8.1%; the increase for the same period last year was
17.2%. The 1991-1992 GWA increase was 22.8%, for 1992-1993 it was 8.9%. In
July 1993 there were 1,298,370 individual social assistance beneficiaries in Ontario.
In five years provincial spending on social assistance has increased from $2.1B
(1988-89) to $6.1B (1992-93).
18. From statistics provided by the Ministry of Community And Social Services(MCSS).
19. The Ontario government claims that the "cap on CAP" has cost the province a total
of $3.3B since it was unilaterally imposed in 1990: Ontario, Turning Point: New
Support Programs For People With Low Incomes (July, 1993) at 9 [hereafter Turn-
ing Point].
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funded agencies. Since that time, MCSS has released a steady stream of new
regulations and policies aimed at restricting access to social assistance.
The scope and direction of the cuts was influenced by the 1992 provincial
Auditor's Report. 20 The Report claimed that the Ministry of Community and
Social Services (MCSS) had lost hundreds of millions of dollars in improper
payments, due to inadequate controls over fraud, failure to make recipients
pursue other financial resources such as CPP and child support vigorously
enough, and insufficient measures to recover outstanding overpayments.
Although the Report's calculations of estimated losses were methodologically
questionable,2 1 the Report contributed to widespread perceptions that social
assistance spending was out of control and that programs were easily
defrauded.22
The Expenditure Control Plan continued some of the government's responses
to the Auditor's report and announced numerous new cost-cutting initiatives,
including eligibility reviews of all recipients, restrictions on retroactive pay-
ments, significantly tightening up financial eligibility by including formerly
exempt assets in budgetary calculations (although the province seems to have
backed down on a plan to charge recipients who own homes for the equity in
their homes) and restricting income exemptions. Following last year's lead,
the government cut further into the STEP program, increasing the tax back rate
on recipients entering the work force.23 Numerous other changes affect partic-
ular classes of recipients. These are discussed below. The government also
saved money by delaying regular rate increases for several months.
Social assistance recipients were also affected by cuts to other Ministries,
including substantial cuts to provincial transfer payments to municipalities. As
municipalities faced their own budget crunches, more and more discretionary
programs of importance to welfare recipients--child care, employment sup-
port programs, etc.-felt the axe.
20. Office of the Provincial Auditor, 1992 Annual Report (Queen's Printer For Ontario).
21. For example, the Report implied losses in cases where eligibility had not been ade-
quately documented, although there is no reason to suppose that all such recipients
were ineligible.
22. Although the Report alleged waste in numerous areas of government, the allegations
of welfare overspending got the bulk of front-page media coverage in Ontario.
23. STEP is a work incentive program which provides a flow through of a percentage of
employment income, according to a complicated formula, to reduce the very high
marginal tax rates on welfare recipients. The government first cut STEP in August
1992 by delaying access to it; it made further cuts in August 1993 by reducing the
income flow-through by $55.00 per month.
Poverty Law in Ontario
Bad as these cuts were, they could have been worse. Although the changes
made life more difficult for many recipients and excluded some people alto-
gether, there were no actual rate decreases and the overall savings expected
from MCSS were less than from some Ministries. However, the fact that the
government was prepared to take as much as it did from the poorest section of
Ontario society left many people increasingly nervous about its longer term
intentions around welfare reform. We will return to that issue after a review of
litigation developments and other current issues.
(b) Litigation Developments And Other Current Issues
This section reviews significant litigation developments (including some
important decisions from other jurisdictions) and some of the main issues
facing Ontario social assistance advocates in the past year.
(i) Social Assistance And The Charter
Social assistance programs and the Charter can intersect in a couple of ways.
First, it has been argued in several cases that poverty as signified by receipt of
social assistance, or receipt of social assistance per se, represents a prohibited
ground of discrimination under s.15 of the Charter. Arguments of this kind
have met with at least some success in Canadian courts. These cases are
discussed more fully elsewhere in this article. 24
Second, there are the cases in which the Charter has been used directly to
challenge aspects of social assistance programs. These kinds of challenges
have not fared as well.25 Once again, attempts to use s.7 to gain additional
protections for social assistance recipients were unsuccessful. In Conrad v.
County of Halifax26, the Nova Scotia Supreme Court held that the Charter did
not prevent termination of welfare benefits without a pre-termination hearing
or other safeguards. 27 Conrad seems in line with the trend of most Canadian
judges to adopt the narrowest possible vision of the scope of the interests
protected in s.7.
The Supreme Court of Canada has shown no interest to date in examin-
ing this issue, having refused leave to appeal in at least one case in
24. See Section E. The Constitution, Human Rights and Poverty Law, infra.
25. See generally Ellsworth & Morrison (1992) for a review of the status of Charter liti-
gation involving social assistance programs up to September 1992.
26. (August 11, 1993) C.H. No. 70286 (N.S.S.C.T.D) [unreported].
27. For a fuller discussion of the case and its implications, see Section E. The Consti-
tution, Human Rights and Poverty Law, infra.
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which the application of s.7 to social assistance programs was directly
raised. 28
There has still been no direct Charter challenge to social assistance in an
Ontario court, although the Ontario Divisional Court has affirmed that SARB
has limited Charter jurisdiction under s.52 of the Constitution Act, 1982.29
SARB has exercised this power in at least one case. In K-10-13-2230 the Board
held that a rule which rendered categorically ineligible any employable person
under age 21 living with his or her parents, violated s.15 of the Charter.
However, the Ministry in K-10-13-22 conceded that the Charter was violated
in the particular circumstances of that case (the appellant had already been
determined in previous proceedings not to be a "dependant" of her parents)
and that the violation was not "saved" by s.1 of the Charter. It remains to be
seen how SARB will deal with a fully contested Charter challenge.31
(ii) Social Assistance and the Canada Assistance Plan
After almost two decades in the courts, the long awaited Supreme Court
decision in Finlay v. Canada was rendered this year.32 Mr. Finlay had
challenged a provincial practice of recovering social assistance overpay-
ments by making deductions from allowances, thus reducing allowances
below the amounts determined necessary for basic needs. He also chal-
lenged the practice in Manitoba of allowing municipalities to establish their
own welfare rates.
The Court agreed unanimously that CAP did not prohibit a province from
allowing municipalities to set welfare rates, as long as the municipalities took
into account the factors required by the Plan. The more difficult question was
the issue of overpayment recovery. With the balance on the Court tipped by
Major J., the Court's most recent appointee, a 5-4 majority ruled that overpay-
ment recovery did not violate the Plan. 33
28. The Supreme Court of Canada refused leave to appeal in Fernandes v. Winnipeg
(1993), 10 Admin. L.R. (2d) 56. This case was discussed in last year's article: see
Ellsworth and Morrison (1992) at 12-13.
29. Director of Income Maintenance Branch, Ministry of Community and Social Ser-
vices v. Mohamed (28 October 1992) File No. 338/91 (Divisional Court) [unre-
ported]. [See Ellsworth & Morrison (1992) 13 n.44.]
30. (April 21, 1993; Bradbury). The applicant was represented by the Peterborough
Community Legal Centre.
31. More cases on this issue are currently before the Board. It is not yet clear whether
the Ministry will continue to concede individual cases and amend the regulation, or
will begin to contest them.
32. Finlay v. Canada (Minister of Finance) (1993), 150 N.R. 81 (S.C.C.).
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Sopinka J., for the majority, agreed that CAP required assistance to be pro-
vided in an amount consistent with basic requirements, but held that this was
not violated by recovering overpayments from allowances because,
"once...recovery is completed the individual will, if her payments over the
entire duration are considered, have received exactly that to which she is
entitled."'34 He concluded that this was compatible with the cost-sharing goals
of CAP, using the commonly advanced but specious argument that "There are
only limited resources to go around. If there are overpayments to some that
cannot be recovered, in the long term others will suffer". 35
A full analysis of the majority decision is not possible here. The "long term
accounting argument" was rejected by McLachlin J., dissenting, who
reasoned:
The long-term accounting approach overlooks the human reality of persons in
need. They have no savings, no reserves. To deny them their monthly alloca-
tion for basic needs is in fact to deny them their food shelter and other basic
necessities, an approach directly at odds with the philosophy behind CAP. It
is moreover, a fallacy that the overpayment was available for basic living
requirements, the assumption on which the long- term accounting argument
rests.
3 6
McLachlin J. also rejected the "limited resources" argument, arguing that it
was irrelevant to the CAP scheme.37
From a legal perspective, Finlay could have been worse, even though the
majority rejected the argument of the intervenor National Anti-Poverty Orga-
nization that CAP established clear national standards with which provinces
had to comply. They held that CAP was strictly a cost-sharing program, in
which the federal government's authority was limited to the parameters of its
constitutional authority for involvement in provincial social assistance, pursu-
ant to the spending power. However, the majority did affirm that provinces
33. The case was initially argued before a seven judge panel on March 23, 1992. Due to
the resignation of Stevenson J., it was reargued on January 28, 1993 before the full
Court.
34. Supra, note 32 at 90.
35. Ibid. at 91.
36. Ibid. at 138-9.
37. The majority argument on this point carries little weight, apart from McLachlin J.'s
rebuttal within the CAP context. The assumption that there is a finite specifically
targeted "pot" which actually determines political allocations in any measurable
way is highly questionable and certainly not as self-evident as Sopinka J. would
have readers believe.
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were not free to ignore the standard of basic necessities which was a condition
of cost-sharing of social assistance under CAP.38 While they held that CAP
was not violated on the facts of that case, the decision implies that a clear CAP
violation could lead to a judicially enforceable remedy.
In the end, however, the legal ramifications of Finlay seem increasingly
irrelevant, at least to Ontario's social assistance programs, in the light of the
federal government's frontal assault on all social spending, including the "cap
on CAP" which has cost Ontario billions of dollars in welfare cost-sharing.39
Since Mr. Finlay began his judicial saga, saving CAP from the federal govern-
ment has become a more urgent priority than using it as a weapon against
recalcitrant provinces.
(iii) The SocialAssistance Review Board
The Social Assistance Review Board (SARB) again saw a steady increase in
business. In the 1992-93 fiscal year SARB received approximately 8600
requests for hearing, an increase of 100% over two years ago (although the
actual number of cases heard did not rise quite so steeply).40 According to
preliminary figures, appeals increased a further 30% in the first two months of
the current fiscal year, with comparable increases in the number of requests for
interim assistance. We do not have comparison figures but it seems safe to
assert that SARB has by far the highest volume of any comparable social
assistance appeal tribunal in the country.
The increased volume of appeals placed a considerable strain on the Board,
which struggled to find ways to use its existing resources more efficiently. Its
responses have included "fast-track" hearings projects in parts of the province
to clear up chronic backlogs, revision of interim assistance procedures, assign-
ing more single member panels to hear cases, revised and simplified decision
formats and, perhaps most controversially, establishment of a new and much
stricter scheduling system.
SARB has succeeded (at least temporarily) in reducing its backlogs both of
requests for interim assistance and in scheduling hearings, although some
problems remain in both areas. Many municipalities misunderstand and resent
the Board's power to award interim assistance and there was a notable increase
in the number of instances of municipalities refusing to pay interim assistance
38. Ibid. at 88.
39. Supra, note 19.
40. Official figures for 1992-1993 are not available. Statistics cited here are from: Letter
from Laura Bradbury, Chair, dated June 21, 1993, to John McKean, Bloor Informa-
tion and Legal Services; and from information provided in meetings with the Board.
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ordered by the Board. Advocates were upset by the Board's attempts to
introduce a "no adjournments" scheduling policy, when hearing dates were set
without consultation with appellants or their representatives. The Board even-
tually modified this policy to one more acceptable to clinic advocates.
The main short-term challenge to the Board will be staying ahead of its
enormous caseload. The Board has indicated that it is examining every aspect
of its operations in efforts to find more efficient ways to use its resources. The
more important long term question facing the Board is what the appeals
system will look like under the NDP government's proposed radical reform of
social assistance.
(iv) "Last Month's Rent" And Municipal Discretionary Spending
Many important social assistance benefits in Ontario are provided solely at the
discretion of municipal governments, with no statutory right of appeal. Histor-
ically, there has been very little litigation in Ontario directed at this discretion.
The Ontario Divisional Court provided no encouragement in this direction in
the first major test case on discretionary assistance.
Simon v. Toronto41 was a challenge to the decision of Metropolitan Toronto to
stop providing social assistance recipients seeking to move or establish a
residence with money for last month's rent deposits. Simon contained a two
part challenge: the first was to the decision to cut all such assistance under a
purely discretionary program, the second was to a policy directive to welfare
workers that money for rent deposits would never be granted under a manda-
tory benefit (the "community start-up benefit") specifically for those establish-
ing new residences in the community.
The case was summarily dismissed. The result is disappointing for many reasons.
The decision never clearly distinguishes between the two separate grounds
for the application. To the extent that the decision affirmed what seemed like
a textbook case of fettering of discretion with respect to the narrower "community
start-up benefit" argument, we suggest that it is simply wrong.
The more disturbing aspect of Simon, however, is the implication that the
impugned decision was not even subject to judicial scrutiny. O'Brien J. stated: "In
my view, courts should be very reluctant to interfere with policy and financial
decisions made by any level of government in these difficult times".42 He went
41. (1993), 61 O.A.C. 389 (Div.Ct.). An application for leave to appeal to the Ontario
Court of Appeal was dismissed August 3, 1993.
42. Ibid.
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on to suggest that decisions not to expend public funds need not even be made
within the statutory frameworks established to govern those decisions.43
The result in Simon is not particularly surprising, but the extraordinary degree
of judicial deference expressed in the decision goes far beyond anything
necessary to the actual issues before the Court. Simon certainly stands as a
major barrier to future attempts to litigate discretionary issues.
(v) Benefit Unit Issues
Because social assistance entitlement is based on family status rather than
purely individual entitlement, problems often arise in trying to define family
relations for social assistance purposes. Social assistance legislation treats as a
single benefit unit any two people otherwise defined as "spouses"44 who are
determined to be "living together". Situations often arise where such
"spouses" share a residence but nothing else. Although several older SARB
decisions found such persons to be members of a benefit unit, more recent
decisions suggest a liberalization of this test. Some panels have held that
spouses were not "living together" where there was no conjugal relationship
and financial or other considerations made separation extremely difficult45, or
where a recipient chose to care for a former spouse for purely humanitarian
reasons 4 6 One panel even held-in contradiction to an earlier decision involv-
ing very similar facts-that a young mother was eligible as a single person
where she lived in a house with the father of her child - along with his wife and
children. 47
Conversely, in Director, Ministry of Community and Social Services v. Roper48
the Ontario Divisional Court affirmed a SARB decision that a couple must
43. bid. citing with approval Hamilton-Wentworth (Regional Municipality) v. Ontario
(1991), 2 O.R.(3d) 716 (Div.Ct.).
44. Current definitions of "spouse" in Ontario social assistance legislation includes rela-
tionships with no conjugal element as traditionally defined; for example, any person
owing a support obligation to an applicant's child is deemed to be a spouse: Family
BenefitsRegulations, R.R.O. 1990 Reg.366, s.l(1).
45. E.g., see SARB K-10-27-32 (November 16, 1992; Renault, Cardinal). The applicant
was represented by West End Legal Services.
46. SARB K-12-24-04 (April 13, 1993; Zinger, O'Connell). The applicant allowed the
86-year-old father of her child to board with her after a long separation, at her
children's request, where spouse was old and sick and needed assistance. The appli-
cant was represented by Kensington-Bellwoods Community Legal Services.
47. SARB K-06-03-12 (May 26, 1993; Hazelle). The applicant was represented by Ham-
ilton Mountain Legal and .Community Services; but see contra SARB J-1O-03-
03R#2 (December 7, 1992; Draper, Adams). The applicant was represented by
Community Legal Service of Niagara South.
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actually live together to be treated as "living together". The appellant was a
disabled recipient who lived in a special environmentally controlled house in
a rural area. Her husband had a job in an urban area and had no job
prospects where she lived, but visited her on weekends. The Ministry had
argued that because there was no marital breakdown between them, she
should be deemed to be in receipt of his entire income as if they were living
together, which would have rendered her ineligible. (The province subse-
quently legislated to preclude such an argument being made on behalf of a
sole support parent who is living apart but not separated from her
spouse. 49)
Other benefit unit problems arise around questions of custody of children.
Several panels have now held that joint custody does not preclude welfare or
FB eligibility even though the child is only with the applicant parent part-
time.50 Indeed, one panel has gone so far as to hold that where two separated
parents have joint custody of a child, both may be entitled to receive a Family
Benefits Allowance for the child, even though the Act does not allow for the
allowance to be prorated and thus both parents would receive the full
allowance.51
(vi) Financial Eligibility
The most important case on financial eligibility in the past year was the
decision of the Divisional Court in Director of Income Maintenance v.
Wedekind5 2. Ms. Wedekind was an FB recipient whose spouse received
Unemployment Insurance benefits. In accordance with federal rules,
income tax deductions were made from his UI benefits, so that the amount
he actually received was considerably less than his full entitlement. Never-
theless, the Director deducted the full UI entitlement from the FB allow-
ance. Although SARB had ruled in numerous cases that income should be
determined on a net rather than gross basis, the Divisional Court affirmed
the Director's position.
48. Director ofIncome Maintenance v. Roper (1993), 62 O.A.C. 76 (Div.Ct.).
49. O.Reg.436/93, amending s-s.2(7)(b) of'R.R.O. 1990 Reg.366, making eligibility
conditional on "separation or desertion".
50. E.g, see SARB L-08-26-30 (April 5, 1993; Brooks, O'Connell). The applicant was
represented by Hastings and Prince Edward Legal Services.
51. SARB L-01-03-03 (May 17, 1993; Heath). The applicant was represented by
Dundum Community Legal Services.
52. (1993), 62 O.A.C. 70 (Div.Ct.).
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The implications of Wedekind are far from settled. There are a wide range of
situations in which social assistance authorities deem welfare recipients to
receive income they do not in fact receive. For example, many recipients have
UI, CPP or workers' compensation benefits that are reduced substantially due
to overpayments, administrative penalties, or garnishment. 53 Prior to
Wedekind SARB held in most such cases that recipients could only be charged
with income actually received or which they could have obtained by taking
appropriate action.54 Since Wedekind the Board has been split, with some
panels distinguishing it wherever possible while others have applied it
broadly.55 An application for leave to appeal to the Ontario Court of Appeal
has been made; whether or not it is granted, there will obviously be more
litigation on this important point.
On a more positive note, the Divisional Court ruled this year that money
borrowed by a welfare recipient to meet mortgage payments was not income. 56
An application for leave to appeal Rubino was filed but later abandoned, so it
remains good law in Ontario, at least for the present.
(vii) Immigrants And Refugees
Provision of social assistance to sponsored immigrants, refugee claimants and
others seeking to remain in Canada on humanitarian grounds has always been
a highly contentious political problem in Ontario, especially in the large
municipalities such as Toronto and environs which have the largest such
populations.
53. Even though most benefits are not ordinarily subject to attachment or garnishment
by creditors, child support obligations are an exception to this rule: Family Orders
andAgreements EnforcementAssistanceAct, R.S.C. 1985, c.4 (2d Supp.).
54. For example see SARB L-01-23-21 (January 6, 1993; Draper) The applicant had
taken out loan insurance several years previously. When she became unable to make
payments, the loan insurance took over. She had no control over insurance pay-
ments and could not divert them to her own use. The payments were not "income".
The applicant was represented by Niagara North Community Legal Assistance.
More common situations involved garnishments or deductions from statutory bene-
fits such as U1 or CPP.
55. For example see SARB L-03-04-28 (June 28, 1993; Cardinal, O'Connell). The appli-
cant was represented by Renfrew County Legal Clinic. (CPP benefits garnished
50% by Family Support Plan-Only net benefits were "income"), SARB L-10-27-24
(July 26, 1993; Campbell). The applicant was represented by Dundurn Community
Legal Services. (U! benefits should be treated as income net of income tax deduc-
tions and 50% garnishment); but see contra SARB L-08-24-19 (June 14, 1993;
Bolduc). The applicant was represented by Elliot Lake and North Shore Community
Legal Clinic. (UI benefits garnished for child support conferred "benefit" on appel-
lant by reducing his debt load and were therefore "income").
56. Rubino v. Metropolitan Toronto (1992), 11 O.R. (3d) 289 (Div.Ct.).
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On the whole, litigation on behalf of such claimants before SARB has been
successful. SARB has generally viewed any efforts by an appellant to obtain
legal status in Canada as evidence of 'residence' and therefore conferring
eligibility. It has rebuked municipalities in several cases for demanding that
applicants produce information which was not within their power to produce,
as a condition of eligibility. It has rejected municipal attempts to refuse welfare
to refugees who entered under group sponsorship when the group sponsors
reneged on their agreements. However, many of these litigation successes
have been wiped out by legislative change. Failed refugee claimants and other
non-residents have been rendered categorically ineligible,57 a move which is
certain to cause great hardship in some cases.58 Furthermore, the regulations
have been amended to deem sponsored immigrants to be getting support from
their sponsors 59 -a particularly unfair move as sponsored immigrants have
no legal right to enforce a sponsorship undertaking.
(viii)Disability Issues
In August 1993 the province finally implemented a 1991 promise to disabled
persons. A disabled recipient may now have a beneficial interest in a trust of
up to $65,000.00 and will not be charged with income from the trust as long as
it is spent on an approved list of disability related expenses.60 The reform is a
limited one: apart from the low capital limit and limited list of approved
expenditures, the amendment is restricted to trusts from inheritances; living
relatives of disabled people still face difficulties providing financial assistance
for special purposes. Nevertheless, it will allow for modest provision of
assistance to disabled persons to meet needs not met by public programs.
On the other hand, the status of many people currently receiving benefits as
"disabled" or "permanently unemployable" persons under the Family Benefits
Act has been threatened by another Expenditure Control Plan initiative. MCSS
has already instituted a plan to review the eligibility of all disabled and
permanently unemployable recipients. A particular problem here is the
57. O.Reg.320/93, amending s.5 of R.R.O. 1990 Reg.366; R.R.O. 1990 Reg.321/93,
amending s.7 of R.R.O. 1990 Reg.537.
58. Many people who do not meet the strict UN Convention definition of "refugee" are
nevertheless not removed from Canada, sometimes because of a policy not to deport
people to sites of civil war such as the former Yugoslavia, sometimes because they
have no travel documentation. Such people may remain in Canada for years or even
permanently, if accepted on humanitarian and compassionate grounds.
59. O.Reg.436/93, amending s.13 of R.R.O. 1990 Reg.366; O.Reg.437/93, amending
s.15 of R.R.O. 1990 Reg.537.
60. O.Reg.436/93, amending s.13 of R.R.O. 1990 Reg.366.
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increased pressure on people receiving provincial disability benefits to apply
for a CPP disability pension. The stringent rules of the CPP disability program
are a real disincentive to attempts by disabled people to re-enter the workforce,
and seem to be wholly at odds with the social assistance system's attempts to
encourage self-sufficiency.
(ix) Students And Welfare
Eligibility of secondary and post-secondary students for welfare assistance has
always been a contentious issue in Ontario. We reported last year on the
problems faced by advocates in finding practical solutions to the plight of
students refused welfare and without other resources and the special inequity
of the student welfare rule whereby whole families were rendered ineligible
simply because one member of the family was a student eligible for an OSAP
grant.61
The province has again changed the student welfare rules. It first announced
that as of September 1993 the program of student grants was discontinued,
with all grants being converted to loans. The province then, with no prior
warning or consultation, amended the GWA regulations to provide that any
student in receipt of a federal or provincial student loan, or ineligible for such
a loan due to family income, was categorically ineligible for welfare.62 There
will still be people ineligible for student loans who will be seeking welfare for
post-secondary education, but this change will affect a large percentage of
those who previously applied to welfare.
One welcome change is a new policy that entire families will no longer be
rendered ineligible because of one family member's school attendance. Under
the new policy the student may simply be removed from the benefit unit.63
(c) Welfare At The "Turning Point"
In July 1993 the government released Turning Point,64 its long awaited white
paper on welfare reform. Turning Point is the first commitment of an Ontario
government to fundamental reform of the welfare system since the institution
of the current system in the 1960's. Turning Point promises to "dismantle
61. Ellsworth & Morrison (1992), at 18-20.
62. O.Reg.437/93, amending s.7 of R.R.O. 1990 Reg.537.
63. R.R.O. 1990 Reg.537 s.7(2.1) (as amended). Unfortunately, while this is the policy
intent of the amendment, as reflected in policy guidelines distributed by the Minis-
try, it is not clear that the regulation actually allows for this result.
64. Supra, note 19.
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welfare as we know it" and transform social assistance from a passive income
maintenance system to an active strategy for economic renewal.
The following are some of the key features of the proposal:
Child and adult assistance will be severed, with current assistance to children
being replaced by the 'Ontario Child Income Program' (OCIP). It is intended
that OCIP will be harmonized with the federal child tax credit and delivered
primarily through the tax system. It will be income tested rather than means
tested and paid on behalf of all children in low income families, including
those not on social assistance.
General Welfare and, Family Benefits will be replaced by the 'Ontario Adult
Benefit' (OAB). The focus of government energy for people on the OAB will
be on job readiness, through education, training or retraining. A new program,
'JobLink', is supposed to "help people to prepare an employment plan that
maps out the education, training and supports necessary to return to the labour
market and to independence". The government claims that JobLink will even-
tually have 100,000 targeted places in educational institutions and pre-
employment programs.
People who participate in JobLink will get an as-yet-unspecified additional
supplement to the OAB, called the Employment and Training Allowance.
Turning Point announced a long term supplement for the elderly and those so
disabled that they cannot reasonably be expected to work. Although not
mentioned in Turning Point, it appears at the time of writing that the govern-
ment also intends a supplement for sole support parents.65
The government has also announced companion reforms intended to
reduce barriers to leaving welfare. The most important are changes to
the Ontario Drug Benefit. This benefit, currently available to social
assistance recipients and the elderly, will be expanded to include the
working poor.
Unfortunately, while the promise to dismantle welfare is clear, the same cannot
be said for much else about Turning Point. Although there have been years of
detailed work done in preparation for social assistance reform, Turning Point
is devoid of enough specific information to determine whether this is a regres-
sive or progressive reform. Nevertheless, there is considerable cause for con-
cern about Turning Point.66
65. Government discussion papers prepared for the purposes of public consultation indi-
cate that some kind of sole-support parent supplement is under consideration, but no
details of this part of the benefit structure have been released.
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Turning Point contains no commitment to assistance which is adequate to
maintain a dignified life in the community. Contrary to the urging of
anti-poverty activists, Turning Point strongly implies acceptance of the neo-
conservative ideology that maintenance of strong work incentives and income
adequacy are incompatible. While the adequacy of the new system cannot be
ascertained without knowing the precise value of all benefits-information
which the government either does not have or will not release67 -Turning
Point states that rates will be pegged to the minimum wage to ensure that
Ontarians are always better off working. As the minimum wage is no longer
sufficient to raise many working poor above the poverty line, Turning Point is
in effect a commitment to inadequacy.
Despite the claim in Turning Point that the proposed reforms go far beyond
those suggested in previous recommendations, the reality is that Turning Point
has considerably narrowed the vision of community participation which has
been a central feature of reform discourse since the release of the first major
advisory report, Transitions, in 1988.68 While Turning Point adopts the lan-
guage of "transition" from welfare to community participation, the concept of
participation has shifted from the Transitions vision of a broad range of
community activities to a strict employment focus.
Apart from the substantive details of the new programs, advocates also have
serious cause for concern about the manner in which the reform is proceeding.
The government has announced that new legislation will be introduced in the
1993 calendar year, with the intention that first and second reading will be
completed in this term with third reading in the spring term, and will be
implemented before the end of its term of office, but it has not yet even decided
who will deliver the new system.69 Even the relatively minor changes intro-
duced over the last two years threw the delivery system into chaos. There are
66. Space here obviously precludes a full analysis of the reform proposals and the initial
responses of the advocacy and activist community. Interested readers may obtain
more detailed analyses from the Clinic Resource Office.
67. However, it will be impossible to extend some kinds of benefits (eg., payments on
behalf of dependent children) to a much larger group without either reducing the
value of the benefit to individuals, cutting expenses in other areas, or committing to
much larger social assistance budgets. The latter option seems out of the question in
the current fiscal environment.
68. Ontario, Report of the Social Assistance Review Committee; Transitions (Toronto;
Queens' Printer, 13 May 1988) (Chair: G. Thomson).
69. Almost unbelievably, despite a decade of debate on social assistance reform, the
government has failed to make a decision on whether the new system will be admin-
istered provincially, municipally or in combination.
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legitimate grounds to be concerned whether such fundamental changes can be
enacted within such a narrow time frame without equal or worse chaos.
Overall, Turning Point represents a drastic narrowing of the NDP's one-time
social vision. No one could argue that the welfare system should become far
more involved in assisting people to prepare for the labour market and to help
those who need help find jobs. However, in the end the question that must be
posed against Turning Point's main thrust is: What jobs? It will be a particu-
larly acute irony if Ontario's first NDP government is the one which finally
succeeds in substantially cutting the value of social assistance benefits and
entrenches a new neo-conservative spin on the old principle of "less eligibil-
ity"70, in return for nothing more than a faster cycling of people through the
most marginal employment market.
2. Worker's Compensation
Beleaguered. That may be the best word to describe the state of the Worker's
Compensation Board in Ontario. In the past year many of the actions of the
Board (which would normally pass almost unnoticed) have been the subject of
newspaper headlines, questions in the provincial Legislative's Question
Period, a Provincial Auditor's report and even of a private member's motion in
the Legislature. 71
(a) New WCB Headquarters
Perhaps the most controversial issue was the Provincial Auditor's report on the
Board's decision to construct and be the principal investor in its new head-
quarters, to be known as Simcoe Place. Concerns raised about the project
included whether it was necessary to construct a new office tower when there
was a glut of office space already available in Toronto, whether the tendering
process was as open and fair as it could have been, whether the Board was
politically accountable for the decisions it had made concerning the project,
70. "Less eligibility" is the phrase traditionally used to describe the fundamental princi-
ple of nineteenth century welfare programs that welfare must always be less attrac-
tive than the least attractive employment alternative, as a deterrent to the "natural
sloth" of the poor.
71. Ontario, Legislative Assembly, Official Report of Debates (Hansard), (May 20,
1993) at 933-942. The motion was moved by Elizabeth Witmer (PC-Waterloo
North). The gist of the motion was that immediate action was needed to rectify the
problems at the Board, including an investigation into the privatizing of workplace
accident and injury insurance, a moratorium on all new entitlement until the
unfunded liability had been dealt with, a reduction of benefit levels and a stream-lin-
ing of administrative procedures, adoption of a value-for-money approach to reha-
bilitation and value-for-money audits of the Board's procedures. The motion was
defeated.
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and even whether the Board had the legal authority to become involved in the
project in the first place. The Auditor was to do a value for money audit of the
Simcoe Place project. While the report confirmed that the project did represent
value for money,72 it was very critical of the Board's decision-making process.
In fact, the Auditor claimed that the major recommendation in the report was
that "the accountability framework within which the WCB operates" should be
examined.73 Overall, the Auditor's report was less than a ringing endorsement
for the Board.
(b) Unfunded Liability
The Board also faced increasing scrutiny over the continued growth of its
unfunded liability.74 Opposition politicians continually berated the govern-
ment with the accusation that the Board's unfunded liability, which stood at
approximately $11 billion at the end of 1992, was increasing at the rate of $100
million per month. 75 In fact, according to Brian King, the vice-chair of admin-
istration, the unfunded liability was expected to increase by only 4% ($440
million) by the end of 1993.76
72. In fact, even this point was qualified by the Auditor. The statement from the
Auditor's report which the Board claimed demonstrated that the project represented
value for money stated
The $26 per square foot non-arms length rental rate paid by the WCB for 70 per
cent of the office space ensures that the investment will provide a reasonable rate of
return comparable to other investments in the Accident Fund.
However, as the Auditor stated in testimony before the Standing Committee on Pub-
lic Accounts,
These are not rentals that are achieved from anywhere outside the board. In other
words, they did construct the rental rate in such a way that it would give them a rea-
sonable rate of return. But this is taking money from one pocket and putting it into
the other.
I stick by my response that there are flaws in the value for money that they have
obtained.
Ontario, Legislative Assembly, Standing Committee on Public Accounts, "Worker's
Compensation Board Subcomittee Report" in Official Report of Debates (Hansard),
No. P-9 (July 23, 1993) at P-122.
73. Ibid. at P-114.
74. For a discussion of the background to this issue and the Board's attempts to rectify
the situation see Ellsworth & Morrison (1992) at 22-23.
75. Supra, note 71 at 933.
76. Martin Mittelstaedt, "WCB uifunded liability rising" The [Toronto] Globe and Mail (14
September 1993) B1. The vice-chair was testifying before a legislative committee.
Poverty Law in Ontario
In truth, the unfunded liability is a convenient issue with which to pillory the
government. Neither of the opposition parties is blameless in the matter. From
1983 to 1985, the last two years of the Conversative regime, the unfunded
liability grew by 166% from $2 billion to $5.44 billion. During five years of
Liberal government, it grew by 69%, from $5.44 billion to $9.1 billion. Even
taking into account the projected figure for 1993, the unfunded liability has
grown by only 27% under the New Democrats' tenure. 7
(c) Fraud
The Board has also been making efforts to deal with fraud within the
Worker's Compensation system. The Board's approach to combat fraud has
included the development of an internal strategy which focused on "preven-
tion, detection, investigation and recovery" and the creation of a Fraud
Investigations Unit. 78 Despite these efforts, the Board admitted that it was
losing over $150 million a year through fraud and theft.79 In its own defense
the Board pointed out that it was precisely because of the anti-fraud strategy
which it had adopted that the magnitude of the problem was becoming more
publicly known, and that its strategy would ensure that the figure would
decrease over time.80
(d) The WCB's "ACTION PLAN"
Last year we commented upon the recommendations of the Report of the
Chairman's Task Force on Service Delivery and Vocational Rehabilitation
and their implications for the Board.81 The Chair and the Vice-Chair of
Administration viewed this Report as the "single most significant event of
1992" for the Board.82 The Board instituted a comprehensive review of the
Report which was to outline the Board's response to the Task Force's recom-
mendations and to report on the implementation of those recommendations (or
77. Worker's Compensation Board of Ontario: Annual Report 1992 at 44.
78. Ibid. at 14.
79. R. Mackie "WCB official defends move against fraud" The [Toronto] Globe and
Mail (date unknown, Spring 1993), page unknown. The anti-fraud strategy focussed
on four areas; Board employees, suppliers of services to the Board or to injured
workers, tax avoidance by employers and workers claiming benefits when they
either weren't disabled or weren't injured on the job.
80. Ibid. Even this point was not without controversy. Both opposition parties called for
the resignation of the Board's chairman when the level of fraud was made public.
This was notwithstanding the fact that it was this chairman who was, in part, respon-
sible for the Board's approach to exposing the level of fraud.
81. Ellsworth & Morrison (1992) at 24-25.
82. Supra, note 77 at 4.
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the reasons why implementation would not occur). The Board's response was the
ACTION PLAM 83
Space prohibits a full analysis of the ACTION PLAN. However, it is divided
into four parts: an overview of the themes of the Task Force Report and the five
goals endorsed by the Board to guide the WCB over the next two years, the
WCB's objectives in response to those themes and goals, a recommendation-
by-recommendation accounting of the WCB's responses to the Task Force
Report and a recommendation-by-recommendation accounting of those
responses by expected implementation dates.84 The Board has and will con-
tinue to publish quarterly reports indicating the success it has had in achieving
its objectives in this area.85
The five themes which the Board has drawn from the Task Force Report are
the following:
" introduction of a new case management model and a new emphasis on
early appropriate vocational rehabilitation
* creating partnerships with stakeholders
• developing a new corporate culture
" developing the internal partnership
" looking to the future. 86
The Board is taking steps to respond to each of these themes. In the area of
improving vocational rehabilitation services one of the Board's goals was the
appointment of a Chief Vocational Rehabilitation Officer. This appointment
was made effective in the late summer of 1993.87 With respect to the develop-
ment of a new corporate culture, one of the goals was to "strive for excellence
as an employer...including proper training and support for staff". Unfortu-
nately the Board has not been as prompt in fulfilling this objective although
some progress has been made.88
83. Ontario Worker's Compensation Board, ACTION PLAN: The WCB's response to
the Report of the Chairman's Task Force on Service Delivery & Vocational
Rehabilitation (November 27, 1992).
84. Ibid. at 2.
85. For example see Ontario Worker's Compensation Board, ACTION PLAN: First
Quarter Report 1993 (April 15, 1993) and ACTION PLAN: Second Quarter Report
1993 (July 14, 1993).
86. Supra, note 83 at 8.
87. For an examination of the Board's efforts on this issue see ACTION PLAN: Second
Quarter Report 1993 Objective 1.1 at 2-1.
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Overall, however, the Board would appear to be making serious efforts to
implement the many good recommendations contained in the Task Force's
Report. The effect of the implementation of these recommendations still
remains to be seen.
(e) Occupational Disease Task Force
Another important event in the field of worker's compensation was the release
of the Report of the Occupational Disease Task Force.89 The Task Force
was set up to examine the principles underlying the determination of
occupational and industrial disease claims. Its process involved examin-
ing the worker's compensation system in the broader context, examining
the legislative provisions applicable to occupational and industrial dis-
eases, reviewing the adjudicative process (including the information
sources and policies available to adjudicators), identifying the issues
and difficulties in the process and making recommendations to facilitate
adjudication. 90
The recommendations made by the Task Force are too numerous to examine in
this context. However, several of them, if followed will have an effect on more
than just occupational disease claims. It stated that serious consideration
should be given to amending the Worker's Compensation Act 91 to
include a "purpose" clause and that, regardless of whether such an
amendment was made, the Board of Directors should insure that the
purpose and intent of legislation are clearly conveyed and reflected
in the development of the guiding principles used by the WCB in
administering the Act.92
The Task Force also opined that the present definition of "accident" should be
altered. It proposed instead that "compensable medical conditions" should be
defined to include "injuries and sudden onset conditions" and "progressive
onset" conditions. 93 Essentially, this would amount to a consolidation of the
88. Ibid. objective 3.13 at 2-18.
89. Ontario, Ministry of Labour Report of the Occupational Disease Task Force
(March, 1993).
90. Ibid. at ix.
91. R.S.O. 1990, c. W-11.
92. Supra, note 89 at 42-43. The purpose and intent of the Act is to provide ...a no fault
insurance scheme funded by employers to provide compensation for injuries and
illnesses when work or work factors made a significant contribution to the develop-
ment of the injury or illness."
93. Ibid. at 56. Injuries and sudden onset conditions would include those conditions
covered under subsections 1(1)(a) and (b) of the present Act; wilful and intentional
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present "accident" section and the section granting entitlement for occupa-
tional disease. The Report stated that this would ensure that occupational
disease was an "integral component" of the compensation system, and recog-
nize that it is part of a continuum of disabilities which can result from work.94
The Task Force also found the present lack of guiding principles for adjudicat-
ing occupational disease claims to be of concern. It inferred that many of the
shortcomings in the present decision-making process were a result of this
absence of principles, and urged the Board of Directors, along with the body
responsible for developing policy, to formulate such guiding principles.95 The
Task Force proposed a revamped Industrial Disease Standards Panel to fill this
policy making role.96 It concluded that the IDSP should be responsible for
developing the specific policies for occupational diseases, subject to the
approval of the Board of Directors. The process of developing such policies
should include consultation with the public and consideration of the concerns
of the Board and the needs of adjudicators. The policies should be published in
the Ontario Gazette along with the IDSP's rationale for adopting them. The
Task Force also recommended that the WCB be required to publish its
response to the IDSP's proposal and its time frame for implementation, or its
reasons why it does not intend to implement the policy.97
The Task Force viewed this expanded role for the IDSP as accomplishing
several things. It would decrease the delays in adopting and implementing
policies. It would ensure external input into the policy development process.
Further, it would mean the elimination of the WCB's department which was
dedicated to reviewing the process and conclusions of the IDSP, a blatant
duplication of effort.98
acts not being the acts of the worker and chance events occasioned by a physical or
natural cause. Progressive onset conditions would include disablements (subsection
1(1)(c)) and occupational diseases. The Task Force also recommended that the pre-
sumptions and requirements for determining causal relationships should also be
placed together in one section of the Act.
94. Ibid. at 55.
95. Ibid. at 73-75.
96. Ibid. at 88. The Task Force recommended that the IDSP have a full time executive
consisting of a neutral chair, two vice-chairs representing labour and employers
respectively and other part-time members who have expertise in the various techni-
cal specialities.
97. Ibid. at 88-89.
98. Ibid. at 88.
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The Task Force consulted widely before the production of its Report. While it
is a lengthy document, it contains many well thought out recommendations,
both for improving the compensation and adjudication of occupational disease
claims as well as for other compensation claims in general. It is hoped that the
government will respond promptly to the initiatives in the Report.
(f) Litigation Developments
(i) Future Economic Loss (FEL) awards
Decision No. 344/9399 was the first case in which the WCAT gave consider-
ation to the issues surrounding a FEL award. 100 The worker suffered a com-
pensable injury in March of 1990. He attempted to return to modified work in
April of 1991, but had to stop after one shift. The WCB closed his vocational
rehabilitation file and terminated his benefits, claiming that the modified work
was suitable. The WCB also did a FEL assessment at this time and found that
the worker was "not entitled" as he had been offered suitable employment at
no wage loss. The worker appealed this decision. The Hearings Officer
decided that the modified work was not suitable and ordered temporary bene-
fits restored from April, 1991. The Hearings Officer also rescinded the FEL
assessment. The WCB reactivated the worker's VR file, but no VR assessment
or FEL assessment were done. A new modified job was developed in April of
1992, but after two days the worker decided that he was unable to do it. The
VR file was closed again and the worker appealed this closure. In September
of 1992 the worker began work with another employer as a salesperson,
although with substantially lower earnings than his pre-accident employment.
In December of 1992 a second Hearings Officer decision determined that the
worker's VR file should not be reactivated, that his entitlement to a EEL award
was denied and that he was not entitled to a FEL supplement. The worker
appealed this decision to the WCAT.
The WCAT found that the second modified job was not suitable for the worker.
The panel also concluded that the WCB's initial determination (in April,
1991), that the worker was "not entitled" to a FEL award was incorrect, as the
worker had met the threshold for entitlement to a FEL award; an injury which
resulted in temporary disability for 12 continuous months. The panel stated
that the real issue which the WCB should have decided was whether the
99. (July 14,1993; McCombie, Barbeau, Lebert).
100. Section 43(1) of the Worker's Compensation Act provides:
43(1) A worker who suffers an injury resulting in permanent impairment or result-
ing in temporary disability for twelve continuous months is entitled to compensation
for future loss of earnings arising from the injury.
(1993) 9 Journal ofLaw and Social Policy
worker had suffered any wage loss or whether a 0% FEL award should have
been made.1 01 In fact, the WCAT interpreted the WCB's and the first Hearings
Officer's decision in this manner. This approach was considered important by
the panel because it allowed for a subsequent review of the FEL award to
conclude that a wage loss had been suffered. If the WCB's approach was
followed, then the worker could never have the FEL decision reviewed in the
future.
WCB policy stated that an appeal of a FEL award should be based upon the
circumstances as they existed at the time of the "original determination".
The WCAT concluded that, as the initial FEL assessment had been
rescinded, the "original determination" date would be the date of the
second Hearings Officer's decision (December, 1992). At that time the
worker was employed as a salesperson and was experiencing a fluctuating
wage loss. The panel reasoned that the wage loss could be addressed by
setting a FEL award to reflect this difference in wages or by granting a
nominal FEL award (a sustainability award) and a FEL supplement which
would fluctuate with the wage loss of the worker.102 The Tribunal viewed
the worker's job as a salesperson as a suitable vocational rehabilitation
program, entitling him to a FEL supplement. The panel concluded that the
worker's future loss of earnings could best be compensated by granting a
FEL sustainability award and a FEL supplement. l0 3
(ii) Implementation of Board ofDirector's Review of
Chronic Pain Decisions
The past year witnessed a continuation of the saga over who has the "final say"
in compensation matters. In several decisions the WCAT was faced with
deciding how (or if) to implement the Review of Decisions No. 915 and
915A.104 Decision No. 12R2 was the first of such decisions.' 0 5
101. Supra, note 99 at 11.
102. Ibid. at 12.
103. Ibid. at 14.
104. (1990), 15 W.C.A.T.R. 245 (WCB Board of Directors). This was one of 25 deci-
sions in which the Tribunal had awarded benefits for chronic pain. Pursuant to
section 93 of the Act, the Board of Directors reviewed all of these decisions.
Section 93 provides:
93(1) Where a decision of the Appeals Tribunal turns upon an interpretation of the
policy and general law of this Act, the board of directors may in its discretion
review and determine the issue of interpretation of the policy and general law of this
Act and may direct the Appeals Tribunal to reconsider the matter in light of the
determination of the board of directors.
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The panel noted that, before even getting to an application of the board of
director's determinations to the facts of the case, consideration should be given
to whether the board of director's review was lawfully constituted. This
involved an examination of three factors:
* did the Tribunal's original decision turn upon an interpretation of the pol-
icy and general law of the Act,
" if it did, was the determination in question a determination of an issue of
interpretation upon which the original decision turned,
" if the review was authorized on the latter two grounds, was it nonetheless
unauthorized by reason of its being patently unreasonable?106
The panel also stated that other concerns may arise, such as whether the rules
of natural justice were met in the review process before the board of
directors.107
Due to the cumulative effect of many factors, the panel was not satisfied in this
case that the preliminary grounds had been met. Their concerns primarily
focused on whether the original decision actually turned upon an interpretation
of the policy and general law of the Act. However, the review process itself
also troubled the panel. Factors such as the delay which occured between the
Tribunal's original decision and the direction from the board of directors to
reconsider the decision, the paucity of reasons given by the board of directors
for its determination and the lack of certainty as to which members of the
board made the decision and whether the decision was unanimous or only by
a majority vote were major concerns on this issue. The panel outlined the
following general guidelines for evaluating the section 93 review process:
* when these extraordinary powers are invoked, the WCAT decision must
be challenged as soon as is reasonably possible;
105. (March 25, 1993; McCombie, Chapman, Cook). The worker was represented by
Injured Workers' Consultants. The other decisions included Decision No 797187RI
(October 29, 1992; McCombie, Shartal, Chapman), Decision No. 178RI (October
14, 1992; Mclntosh-Janis, Lebert, Chapman), Decision No. 178R12 (December 10,
1992; McIntosh-Janis, Lebert, Chapman), Decision No. 284188R1 (November 3,
1992; Moore, Cook, Meslin), Decision No. 396R1 (November 11, 1992; Moore,
Lebert, Nipshagen) and, Decision No. 757R (June 29, 1993; Onen, Shartal,
Barbeau).
106. Ibid. at 22. These criteria were adopted from Decision No. 42/89 (1989), 12
W.C.A.T.R. 85 at 100.
107. The panel posited this inquiry as a "threshold test", different from the one usually
applied by the Tribunal in reconsideration decisions.
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" when a WCAT decision is challenged, the substantive arguments and
objections of the parties and, in particular, of the appellant whose deci-
sion is under review must be fully answered, and;
" the decision-makers must be plainly identified and any dissenting views
must be noted in writing. 108
It will be interesting to see how the board of directors responds to this decision of
the Tribunal. Could this decision be reviewed pursuant to section 93?
(iii) Permanent Partial Disability Supplements
In Decision No. 50/93109 the worker had suffered a back injury for which he
received a 15% pension. He had returned to work but was sent home in
December, 1990 because there was no longer any suitable work. The Board
took no further action until February, 1991 although the worker's 147(2)
supplement was reduced to a 147(4) supplement. 110 The worker appealed this
reduction. The Tribunal concluded that the Board was penalizing the worker
for the Board's own inactivity. The worker had kept in contact with the
employer and his union office regarding other suitable work. This is what he
had done (and had been instructed to do by the Board) during previous periods
of vocational rehabilitation. The Tribunal concluded that these actions met the
requirements of the Board's policy on full supplementary benefits and granted
the worker's appeal.
In Decision No 5921921111 the worker was receiving a pension and a 147(2)
supplement. He was sponsored in training program by the Board, but in 1990
had failed four of five courses and was dismissed from the program. He had
108. Supra, note 105 at 28-29.
109. (February 18,1993; Mclntosh-Janis, Shartal, Chapman).
110. Section 147(2) and (4) provide:
147(2) Subject to subsections (9) and (10), the Board shall give a supplement to a
worker who, in the opinion of the Board, is likely to benefit from a vocational reha-
bilitation program which could help to increase the worker's earning capacity to
such an extent that the sum of the worker's earning capacity after vocational rehabil-
itation and the amount awarded for permanent partial disability approximates the
worker's average or net average earnings, as the case may be, before the worker's
injury.
(') Subject to subsections (8), (9) and (10), the Board shall give a supplement to a
worker,
(a) who, in the opinion of the Board, is not likely to benefit from a vocational reha-
bilitation program in the manner described in subsection (2); or
(b) whose earning capacity after a vocational rehabilitation program is not increased
to the extent described in subsection (2) in the opinion of the Board.
111. (February 16, 1993; Moore, Lebert, Howes).
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been reinstated in the program, but failed to write his exams in February, 1991.
The Board discontinued vocational rehabilitation services and reduced his
supplement to a section 147(4) supplement. The worker appealed. The Tribu-
nal concluded that the worker's lack of success in the program was not due to
lack of cooperation but was because the program was not suitable. While the
Board was justified in terminating sponsorship in the program, the worker
would still benefit from appropriate vocational rehabilitation services and
therefore remained entitled to a section 147(2) supplement.
3. Unemployment Insurance
(a) Bill C-113
Bill C-113, An Act to Provide for Government Expenditure Restraint11 2 was
the subject of much public debate. The Bill was seen by many as a further step
to undermine the unemployment insurance scheme in place in Canada and to
bring it more into line with the scheme in the United States. It was not a direct
amendment to the Unemployment Insurance Act.113 Rather, it was a money
Bill whose aim was to cut government spending. With rising unemployment,
the federal government was concerned about controlling and limiting expendi-
tures to the unemployed.
The Bill cut the UI benefit rate from 60% of insurable earnings to 57%. This
"temporary" measure is to last until April 1995.114 Further, those workers who
voluntarily leave employment without just cause (i.e., quit) or who are fired
for misconduct will now be categorically ineligible for benefits. 115 Previously
these claimants were subject to a period of disqualification but were ultimately
entitled to benefits. Previously section 28(4) of the UIA named five possible
grounds that could constitute just cause. This has expanded to include 14
possible grounds.116 Policy guidelines give examples of 40 instances where
just cause may be found to exist.117
112. S.C. 1993, c. 13. Proclaimed in force April 3, 1993.
113. R.S.C. 1985 c. U-1, as amended. Hereinafter the UIA.
114. SOR/93-178, section 1.
115. Supra, note 112, section 21.
116. Ibid. section 19.
117. Canadian Employment and Immigration Commission, Digest of Benefit Entitlement
Principles, Vol. 1, Ch. 6 "Voluntarily Leaving Employment" at 26-44. The list was
previously and does remain an open list. It is not limited by statute to those named
grounds. The government feels the list includes all those grounds presently recog-
nized by the jurisprudence.
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The Policy guidelines also state that the benefit of the doubt will be given to
claimants under these provisions, however this principle is not stated in the
legislation itself.118 Further, according to the UIA, claimants must still prove
that there was "no reasonable alternative to leaving the employment" in
question. The burden of proof is placed on claimants to prove they were not
fired for misconduct or did not quit without just cause. Many of these workers
will be the most vulnerable of working persons. It is feared that these workers
will feel compelled to accept poorer or less safe working conditions rather than
leave their employment. This will undermine the enforcement of provincial
employment standards and health and safety legislation.
One additional ground that is not set out in s. 28 of the UIA, but will be
accepted as just cause for leaving work, is where employees leave work
according to an employer downsizing/ employee buy-out arrangement. Such
claimants may receive benefits if they otherwise qualify.119
(b) Retraining
The Minister for Employment and Immigration announced in December 1992
that he was committing $250 million over the next five years to develop a
comprehensive "human resource strategy" (i.e., retraining). To date much of
the UI training money has been directed out of the UI fund. It is therefore
heavily subsidized by employees. It is difficult to properly assess this retrain-
ing initiative. Money allocated so far appears to have gone to retraining and
upgrading the skills of already highly skilled workers. It would appear that no
substantial funds have been allocated to the less skilled or unskilled worker.
The trainers are private companies which are not subject to close regulation
despite the considerable government funding. There is very little possibility of
carefully monitoring the benefit derived from the programmes offered.
It is too early to determine the impact that these changes will have on the
unemployed. However, whether it is provincial social assistance or federal
unemployment insurance, the myth of wide-spread fraud on the system is
being perpetuated by the respective governments. 120 Therefore, it is antici-
pated that there will be increased investigations of UI claims.
118. Ibid. at 6-8.
119. Supra, note 113, section 44(w.1).
120. See the discussion about fraud in Section C SOCIAL ASSISTANCE and
WORKER'S COMPENSATION, supra.
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(c) Litigation Developments
(i) Claimants'Rights
In R v Mascia1 21 the claimant was convicted of ten counts of false reporting
contrary to s. 103 of the UIA. The conviction was based on admissions made
during an interview with an investigating officer employed by the Commis-
sion. The Claimant had been employed for four months while he was receiving
benefits from the Unemployment Insurance Commission. An investigations
officer with the Commission requested an interview with the Claimant after
noting some irregularities with the claim.122 The claimant did not know what
the subject of the interview was until he arrived and at no time was he
cautioned as to his rights to counsel or that he need not participate in the
interview. In response to questioning, he admitted that he had signed the report
cards in issue and that he had been employed while in receipt of benefits. After
these admissions were made, the investigations officer advised the Claimant
that he would forward the information to his superiors at the Commission and
a decision would be made as to what sanction would be imposed.123 It was
admitted that the Commission would not have been able to prove its allega-
tions in the absence of the admission by the claimant.
The claimant appealed, on the ground that the admissions were not voluntary
and were therefore inadmissable, that his right to be free from self-incri-
mination pursuant to section 7 of the Charter was infringed and that he had
been detained by the investigator during the interview and was therefore
entitled to be advised of his right to counsel, pursuant to section 10(b) of the
Charter.124
121. [1993] O.J. No. 638 (O.C.J.) (QL) [unreported].
122. The Claimant was sent a Notice to Report pursuant to s. 41(6) of the Unemployment
Insurance Act. Section 41(6) basically requires the claimant to attend and supply
information to the Unemployment Insurance Commission. This Notice is normally
sent to persons whose current claims and benefits are being investigated. However
it was a past claim that was being investigated in this instance. This notice provided
in bold print:
This interview is to obtain information required by the commission to determine
your entitlement to unemployment insurance benefits. Not reporting may result in a
denial or suspension of benefit.
123. The Commission could impose one of three sanctions:
1. a repayment;
2. a repayment and internal fine; or
3. a repayment and institution of criminal charges.
See sections 35, 103 and 104 of the UIA.
124. Supra, note 121 at 1.
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The Court in Mascia held that the trial judge appeared to apply the correct test
of voluntariness and had reached his conclusion on all the facts before him.
There was no error made. This ground of appeal failed. 125 The Court also held
it was not necessary to consider whether the claimant was "detained" during
the interview. Therefore the Court did not decide whether his s. 10(b) right to
counsel may have been infringed. 126
The balance of the decision considered whether section 7 of the Charter
protects a person who is statutorily compelled to give information from having
that information used against him or her in a subsequent criminal proceeding.
The Court stated that section 7 requires that "use immunity" be provided
whenever a person is statutorily compelled to testify and his testimony may be
used against him in a criminal proceeding. 127 The Court also held that it was
quite apparent that s. 7 of the Charter includes the right to remain silent. This
right arises "when the coercive power of the state is brought to bear against the
individual". It is when the adversary relationship comes in to existence
between the state and the individual that the right to silence first emerges.128
The Court reasoned that once the state suspected the claimant of falsifying his
claims and placed him in the position that he must answer pertinent questions
(under statutory compulsion), the "adversary relationship" was created. There-
fore, the section 7 right to remain silent arose when the claimant was speaking
to the investigations officer. In the Court's view, when the state used the
statement that it had statutorily compelled from the claimant to prove the
criminal offence with which he was charged, that amounted to the conscripting
of the claimant against himself, and was a violation of the appellant's right to
silence. The claimant succeeded on this ground of appeal. 129
R vDiggs130 involved a criminal prosecution of a UI claimant for making false
or misleading statements. The investigation officer employed by the Commis-
sion had reason to suspect that the claimant had worked during a previous
claim without reporting that fact. She requested the claimant to come in to the
125. Ibid. at 4.
126. Ibid. at 17.
127. Ibid. at 6-7. Citing Thomson Newspapers Ltd. v. Director of Investigation &
Research (1990), 54 C.C.C. (3d) 417 (S.C.C.).
128. Ibid. at 14. Citing R v Hebert (1990), 57 CCC (3d) 1 (S.C.C.).
129. Ibid. at 15-16. However, if the state had used the information it obtained strictly for
its own administrative purposes, then the claimant's right to remain silent would not
have been violated.
130. (May 19, 1993), Dartmouth #299880 -299909 (N.S. Prov. Ct.) [unreported].
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office to answer some questions. 131 During the course of this interview the
claimant gave some statements which the Commission attempted to use in the
criminal prosecution. As in Mascia, at issue in this case were whether the
claimant's right to remain silent (section 7) and his right to counsel (section
10(b)) had been violated.
The Court concluded that the claimant had not been "detained" and thus there
was no obligation on the investigation officer to advise the claimant of his right
to counsel. 132 In coming to this conclusion the Court noted that the claimant
was not obliged to attend the meeting, that he came and left the meeting on his
own, that at the time of the interview the investigation officer had not formed
an opinion as to the reasons for the claimant's misleading statements, and that
there was no evidence from the claimant that he believed that he was
detained. 133
The Court also held that the claimant's right to silence had not been infringed.
On the basis of the Hebert134 case, the Court stated that the right to remain
silent only arose upon detention. The Court distinguished the decision in
Beals135 on two grounds. The first was that the evidence, viewed objectively,
did not show that the claimant would have felt compelled to attend and make
the statements which he did. The second was that there was no subjective
evidence to show that the claimant felt compelled to make the statements
which he did, as he did not testify on this issue. 136
131. The investigation officer in this case testified that she simply telephoned the claim-
ant and asked him to come and talk about what happened. She stated that the Com-
mission no longer used the Notice to Report because of the decision in R. v. Beals
(1991), 68 C.C.C. (3d) 277 (N.S.C.C.). For a discussion of this case see Ellsworth &
Morrison (1992) at 32-33.
132. Supra, note 130 at 14.
133. Ibid. at 10-12.
134. Supra, note 128.
135. Supra, note 131. In Beals the court had found a violation of the section 7 right to
silence in circumstances very similar to Mascia; that is, the statements were com-
pelled by statute.
136. Supra, note 130 at 16-17. The one glimmer of hope in this reasoning is that it leaves
open the possibility that a claimant who, out of the not unnatural (nor unwarranted)
fear that the refusal to consent to the interview would jeopardize his or her benefits
goes to the interview and makes an incriminating statement, could still argue that
subjectively he or she felt compelled to make the statement.
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(ii) Jurisdiction of Boards and Umpires
With disentitlement and disqualifications being so oppressive under the cur-
rent UI scheme it is important that claimants have a meaningful right of appeal.
Unfortunately many boards of referees and some Umpires are deferring to the
Commission in some very important areas. It is arguable that they are in fact
declining jurisdiction which is mandated to them on an appeal.
Where a claimant is disqualified under section 27(1)(a) or (b) (or prior to Bill
C-113, under section 28) the claimant has his or her benefit rate reduced to
50% of insurable earnings and the reduction continues "for such weeks as the
Commission may determine within the benefit period". 137 The Commission
has no discretion to vary the 50% reduction rate.138 The reduction in benefit
need not be for the entire benefit period, but may be only for some portion of
it.139
The real issue in such cases is whether the Commission's decision as to the
length of time for which the reduction applies is reviewable by the board of
referees and/or the Umpire. There is no decision of an Umpire to date that has
expressly stated that this is so. Two decisions have come close. In CUB-
21695140 the Umpire stated that at the very least the board may refer the matter
back to the Commission for reconsideration and require a report as to the
Commission's decision. The Umpire asked the Commission to re-evaluate the
period of reduction in this case. In CUB-20509141 the Umpire referred the
matter back to a differently constituted board and therefore impliedly found
that the board had jurisdiction to vary the duration. However, in CUB-
21665142 and CUB-21673143 the Umpire expressly stated that the decision is
not reviewable. Finally CUB-21318 referred the matter back to the Commis-
sion and is therefore not determinative of the issue.
137. Supra., note 113, sections 30(6) and (7).
138. For example see: CUB-20683 (January 3, 1992; Rouleau J.), CUB-20795 (February
24, 1992; McKay J.), CUB-21419 (June 3, 1992; Rouleau, J.), CUB-21628 (June 9,
1992; Jerome, J.).
139. For example see: CUB-21665 (June 8, 1992; Walsh, J.), CUB-21318 (June 17,
1992; Dennault, J.), under appeal to the Federal Court, CUB-21695 (June 26, 1992;
Reed, J.) under appeal to the Federal Court, CUB-20509 (October 25, 1992; Reed, J.).
140. Ibid.
141. Ibid.
142. Ibid.
143. (June 1, 1992; Walsh J.).
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Two of these decisions, CUB-21318 and CUB-21695 are under appeal to the
Federal Court of Appeal. However, the real issue before the courts appears to
be whether the Commission has a discretion to exercise in setting the period
for which the reduction applies and not whether that decision by the Commis-
sion is reviewable. As noted above, with the increased severity of the penalty
for disentitlements and disqualifications, a meaningful appeal process is of
paramount importance. While neither of the decisions under appeal provides
any kind of careful analysis of the provisions in question, it is hoped that the
Federal Court will clarify the issue, in a favourable way for claimants. 144
(iii) Availability for Work -Full Time Students
In Landry v Canada (AG)145 the Court held that an error in law had been
made by an Umpire who had held that a claimant was not available for
work merely because he was a full-time student. The Court stated that there
may be a presumption to this effect, but that a claimant may rebut that
presumption on the facts. 146 In this case the Court was not satisfied that the
claimant had rebutted the presumption. The claimant had not been believed
when he stated that he would have quit his studies if employment had
become available.
It would appear that in such cases it will be necessary for a claimant to satisfy
the Commission or, on appeal, a board of referees or an umpire that he or she
was looking for employment, and that the course of studies would not have
prevented the claimant from accepting employment if it was offered. This
might require the claimant to quit all or part of his or her studies.
(iv) Interruption of earnings
In Canada vDuffenaisI47 the claimant's employment had been reduced to one
day per week. He was informed by a Commission employee that he could
work any day of the week and it would not affect his UI entitlement. However,
the employee did not inform him that he had to have seven consecutive days
of no work and no earnings in order to be eligible. 148 The claimant returned to
144. A similar debate has arisen under section 33 of the UIA. Under s. 33(1) the Com-
mission may impose a penalty upon claimants where "in its opinion" they have
made false or misleading statements. CUB-20766 (February 14, 1992; Denault J.)
concluded that board of referees had no power to vary a section 33 penalty. How-
ever, in a well-reasoned decision, the Umpire in CUB-21413 (May 11, 1992; Joyal
J.) expressly disagreed with CUB-20766, and noted that the issue would have to be
resolved by the Federal Court. To date, this issue has not been appealed.
145. (1992), 152 N.R. 164 (F.C.A.).
146. Ibid. at 165.
147. (1993), 154 N.R. 203 (F.C.A.).
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his one day of work after only five days off. The Commission found him
ineligible, as he did not have an interruption of earnings. The Court held that
despite the fact that the claimant had acted to his detriment on erroneous
advice from a Commission agent, the claimant was not eligible as there was no
exception to the statutory requirements 149.
(v) Negligent Misrepresentation
The only remedy for a claimant such as the one in Duffenais may be to sue the
Crown for damages for negligent misrepresentation. This issue was considered
in the UI context in Yaholnitsky v. Canada.150 The plaintiff was suing the
Commission for representations made to her concerning the eligibility for and
duration of maternity benefits. The Court set out the five-part test for success
in a negligent misrepresentation action as follows:
a) there must be a representation which is inaccurate or misleading;
b) the representation must have been made negligently;
c) there must be a duty of care based on a "special relationship" between the
representor and representee;
d) the representee must have relied, in a reasonable manner, on the negligent
misrepresentation; and
e) damages must have resulted from the representee's reliance on the negli-
gent misrepresentation. 151
In Yaholnitsky the Court found that the representations made by the Commis-
sion employees were not inaccurate or misleading.152 However, in Duffenais
the Court accepted that the claimant had acted upon erroneous or misleading
advice.153 It would also appear to be without question the claimant reasonably
relied on the representation (by returning to work) and suffered damages (the
loss of his UI entitlement). It might be more difficult to establish that a "special
relationship" existed between the claimant and the Commission employee
responsible for adjudicating claims under the Act and advising claimants as to
their rights and responsibilities so as to give rise to a duty of care. The most
difficult issue would be in determining whether the representations were made
negligently (i.e., whether in the context of the situation the information con-
148. Supra, note 113, section 6(2) and section 37(1) of the Unemployment Insurance
Regulations C.R.C. 1978, c. 1576, as amended.
149. Sup ra, note 147 at 205.
150. (June 23, 1993), Action No. T-3006-91 (F.C.T.D.) [unreported].
151. Ibid. at 5.
152. Ibid. at 6.
153. Supra, note 147 at 205.
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veyed to the claimant who asked how working one day per week would affect
his UI eligibility, was sufficient).154
4. Canada Pension Plan
(a) Appeals Process
The past year has seen the first appeals dealt with by the new Review Tribu-
nal. 155 The Review Tribunal was meant to provide a more professional and
independent second level of appeal in the CPP appeal process. Anecdotal
evidence seems to suggest that the Tribunal is in fact achieving this end.156 The
Commissioner of Canada Pension Plan Review Tribunals appears to be aware
of the shortcomings of the old Review Committees, and is making efforts to
ensure that the Tribunal is, and is perceived to be, at arm's length from the
Minister and the Income Security Programs Branch of the Minister of National
Health and Welfare. 157
The hearing process before the Review Tribunal has become somewhat more
formalized as well. (In fact, the Tribunal has its own Rules of Procedure which
should be consulted throughout the appeal process.) As soon as an appeal is
acknowledged, the Commissioner writes to the Minister to request copies of
all material used in making the initial decision. A copy of this material is
provided to the appellant (or his or her legal representative) for review before
the hearing. The appellant also has the ability to submit additional evidence
either before or at the hearing, although it is probably a good policy to provide
such material before the hearing so the Tribunal panel may review it. When the
Tribunal has reached its decision, the decision will be communicated to the
parties by the Commissioner.158
154. For a good discussion of these issues see The Queen v. Cognos Inc., [1993] 1 S.C.R.
87 (S.C.C.).
155. For a fuller discussion of the effect of the amendments to the appeal process, see
Ellsworth & Morrison (1992) at 39.
156. Conversation of the author with Mr. Ron Stuart, Commissioner of Canada Pension
Plan Review Tribunals, June 17, 1993. However, some legal clinics have reported a
less than cooperative attitude on the part of some of the staff in the Office of the
Commissioner, especially in so far as scheduling of hearings is concerned. The
Commissioner does seem to be open to input on Tribunal procedures, and has been
responsive to clinic concerns.
157. Ibid.
158. This information is provided to appellants by the Office of the Commissioner of
Canada Pension Plan Review Tribunals in a handout entitled "Information
for appellants and other parties to an appeal to a Canada Pension Plan Review
Tribunal" (May, 1993).
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While more independence and more consistent decision making on the part of
the Review Tribunal is sure to be welcome by advocates, there is a downside.
It is likely that fewer cases will be granted leave to appeal to the Pension
Appeals Board, due to the increased competence of the Review Tribunal panels.
(b) Disability Eligibility Criteria
As was noted last year, the disability eligibility criteria were amended, effec-
tively allowing many who would not previously have qualified for a disability
pension because they had not made sufficient contributions to qualify for such
a pension. 159 Specifically, section 44(1)(b)(iv) of the Canada Pension Plan
provides that a disability pension is payable to a contributor who:
...is a contributor to whom a disability pension would have been payable at the
time the contributor is deemed to have become disabled had an application for
a disability pension been received prior to the time the contributor's applica-
tion for a disability pension was actually received.160
As would not seem surprising (given the convoluted wording) the application
of this subsection has not been without controversy or confusion. This situa-
tion will probably remain unchanged for the near future, at least until the PAB
gives consideration to the interpretation of this section.
Previously, in order for an applicant to be eligible for a CPP disability pension
s/he must not only have been found to be disabled but also to have made
sufficient contributions to the Plan within his or her qualifying period. 161
Health and Welfare's normal practice in disability cases was to first determine
whether an applicant had made sufficient contributions to qualify for a
pension. If not, the applicant was determined not to be qualified, regardless
of whether or not s/he was disabled. Now however, if an applicant does
not qualify for a pension under the above criteria, then Health and
Welfare will, (allegedly) pursuant to section 44(1)(b)(iv), determine
when the applicant last met the contribution requirements. When that
date is determined, they then decide whether the applicant was disabled on that
date. If so, the applicant would be eligible for a disability pension.162
159. For the discussion of these amendments, see Ellsworth & Morrison (1992) at 36-37.
160. R.S.C. 1985, c. C-8, as amended.
161. Ibid. sections 44(1)(b)(ii) and 44(2)(b). In the vast majority of cases "sufficient con-
tributions" means contributions within five of the last ten years or two of the last
three years.
162. However, the pension would only be payable beginning with the eleventh month
prior to the application pursuant to which this determination was made. See section
69 of the Canada Pension Plan.
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Clearly this amendment is an improvement over the state of affairs which
existed previously. Arguably, the manner in which it is being interpreted and
applied by Health and Welfare does not always produce the best result for the
applicant. For example, suppose a person had contributed to the Plan for the
years 1981-85 inclusive. In 1986 the person became disabled, and made no
further contributions. In January of 1993 the person applied for a disability
pension. By applying the "deemed disability" section, Health and Welfare
would determine that the person's contributory period ended in 1991 and
included the years 1982-1991. The person would only have contributed for
four of those years and thus would not be eligible for a pension. However, by
virtue of the new amendment the person would be eligible. Health and Welfare
would determine that the person last met the contributory requirements in
1990, when s/he would have contributed five out of the last ten years. At that
time the person was also disabled and so would be eligible for a pension.
While this is a better result than would have been reached under the old
legislation, it is not the most favourable one. Arguably, Health and Welfare
could have gone back to the date when the applicant became disabled, which
was 1986. At this point the applicant had met the contributory criteria and was
disabled. The advantage to the applicant in this approach is that the years
1987-90 are not included in his or her contributory period for the purposes of
calculating the level of disability benefit.
(c) Litigation Developments
(i) Reconsideration on new facts-Right of appeal
One of the first actions taken by the Commissioner of Review Tribunals
required clarification by the Federal Court, Trial Division. The applicant had
applied for a disability pension but had been denied in 1987. She failed to
appeal the decision within the required time. In 1991 she applied to have the
Minister reconsider the decision on the basis of new facts, pursuant to section
84(2) of the Plan. 163 The Minister did not change his decision. The applicant
attempted to appeal the Minister's decision to the Review Tribunal, but the
Review Tribunal concluded that it did not have jurisdiction to hear the appeal.
The applicant brought an application for judicial review in which the issue to
be decided was whether the Minister's decision under section 84(2) could be
appealed to the Review Tribunal.
The Federal Court, Trial Division in Peplinski v. Canada,164 ordered the
Review Tribunal to hold a hearing. In reaching this conclusion Noel J. stated:
163. Section 84(2) allows the Minister, inter alia, to rescind or amend a decision given
by him or her, where new facts are present.
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It follows that this right of appeal can only be exercised if the Minister decides
to reconsider his original decision in light of new facts. If the Minister, in the
exercise of his discretion under subsection 84(2), concludes that there are no
new facts which would warrant a reconsideration of the original decision, no
fresh decision can be said to have been rendered and no right of appeal lies
under subsection 82(1). However, if the Minister decides that the new facts
warrant a reconsideration of his original decision, a fresh decision will result
under subsection 84(2) as it will be based on facts different from those under
consideration when the original decision was rendered, and a right of appeal
lies under subsection 82(1). This is the result whether or not the original
decision is amended, rescinded or is allowed to stand as originally rendered.
A decision based on new facts is a fresh decision irrespective of whether the
original decision is allowed to stand or not.165
As there is no time limit to apply for a reconsideration under section 84(2), the
section may be used to reverse an initial denial of entitlement by characterizing
new medical evidence as "new facts", even in circumstances where an appeal
of the initial denial would be out of time (as was the case in Peplinski). The
case is important because the court appears to affirm the principle that, at least
in some circumstances, such decisions on reconsideration are appealable
through the normal process. However, the distinction that the court makes
between a decision not to review a case on the basis of new facts and a decision
not to change a decision after reviewing new facts may be difficult to apply in
practice. In almost any case, it is likely to be arguable that the original decision
was reviewed in light of the new facts and is therefore subject to appeal. In
Peplinski itself, the Federal Court found that the Minister had reviewed the
original decision on eligibility, notwithstanding fairly ambiguous evidence on
this point. 16 6
(ii) Survivor's benefits-Common law spouse
In Minister of National Health and Welfare v. Mosher167 the applicant argued
that the requirement, contained in then section 64 of the Canada Pension Plan,
that a common law spouse have resided with a deceased contributor for one
year before his or her death in order to be eligible for a surviving spouse's
164. [1993] 1 F.C. 222 (T.D.). The applicant was represented by the Renfrew County
Legal Clinic.
165. Ibid. at 227.
166. After the court's decision, the applicant submitted her material for the appeal to the
Review Tribunal. However, the Minister conducted another reconsideration
(although on no new facts) in March of 1993 and awarded the applicant a disability
pension retroactive to 1986.
167. (1990), C.E.B. & P.G.R. # 8616. For a more detailed discussion of this case see
Ellsworth & Morrison (1991) at 45-46.
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pension violated the equality rights section Charter. The Canada Pension Plan
does not have the same requirement for a legally married spouse, and the
applicant argued that this was discrimination on the basis of marital status.
However, the PAB found no violation of the Charter. The applicant has
commenced a judicial review of the PAB decision, seeking to have the deci-
sion set aside and a declaration that the decision erred in ruling that section 64
was not contrary to the Charter.168
(iii) Disability pensions and the Charter
Last year we reported on the PAB's decision in the Johnston169 case. Unfortu-
nately, the Pension Appeals Board has again decided that the differing contrib-
utory and eligibility requirements applicable to disabled contributors do not
violate the equality rights section of the Charter. In Minister of National
Health and Welfare v. Sinclair170 the PAB merely adopted the simplistic
reasons from the earlier decision in Johnston.171 Perhaps this outcome was not
suprising as MacIntosh and Dureault JJ.A., two of the PAB members in
Sinclair, were also members of that earlier Board in Johnston.
The applicant in Sinclair also argued that the contributory and eligibility
criteria violated her section 7 rights under the Charter. On this issue the PAB
adopted the reasoning in the earlier decision of Kartisch172 and concluded that
while the differing criteria "may result in a negative and economic conse-
quence" they did not violate section 7. Again, this result is probably not
surprising as the panel in Sinclair was the same panel that decided Kartisch.
While these decisions do not preclude poverty law practioners from arguing
that these provisions violate the Charter in future cases before the PAB, it may
be that an application to the courts or a judicial review of one of the PAB
decisions will be necessary to satisfactorily resolve this issue.
(iv) Chronic pain
One of the most positive notes in the jurisprudence of the Pension Appeals
Board in the past year is the emerging recognition that a person suffering from
chronic pain may be eligible for a disability benefit under the Plan. The PAB
168. Mosher v. Canada, Action No. T-598-91 (F.C.T.D.) [unreported].
169. Minister of National Health and Welfare v. Johnston (1991), C.E.B. & P.G.R. #
9214. See Ellsworth & Morrison (1992) at 41-42.
170. (1992), C.E.B. & P.G.R. 8501. The applicant was represented by the Advocacy
Resource Center for the Handicapped.
171. Ibid. at 5960.
172. Minister of National Health and Welfare v. Kartisch (1991), C.E.B. & P.G.R. 8625.
For a discussion see Ellsworth & Morrison (1991) at 43.
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considered this issue in Reichel,173 Thompson174 and Densmore.175 In all three
cases the PAB had no difficulty in accepting that chronic pain syndrome exists,
but stated that the real issue was whether the pain was so severe that the
sufferer was prevented from "regularly pursuing a substantially gainful occu-
pation". As the Board in Densmore reasoned
The issue is difficult becaue its resolution depends upon the view which the
Board ultimately takes of the genuineness of what are strictly subjective
symptoms. In effect, the judgment call, made generally without the assistance
of objective clinical signs, will be one of credibility on a case by case basis, as
to the severity of the pain complained of.176
In discussing the type of evidence which would be required in order to support
a conclusion that the chronic pain syndrome was "severe" the Board stated in
Reichel
By its very nature, there can be no objective evidence as the pain being
described by the patient is inconsistent with clinical findings. Psychiatric
evidence may not be required in all cases, but such evidence would be viewed
as helpful for most. Clearly the evidence of an applicant, particularly respect-
.ag his or her efforts to cope with the pain and to receive treatment is
imperative. 177
In fact, all three decisions stress the importance of having the applicant give
testimony concerning the effects of the syndrome on their daily lives.
D. DEVELOPMENTS IN HOUSING LAW
1. Rent Control and the Landlord and Tenant Act 178
The Rent Control Act 179 replaced the former Residential Rent Regulation
Act.180 Under the RRRA, and now under the RCA, tenants are able to apply for
173. Minister of National Health and Welfare v. Reichel (1991), C.E.B. & P.G.R. 9218.
174. Minister of National Health and Welfare v. Thompson (November 30, 1992),
Appeal: CP 2310 (Pension Appeals Board)[unreported]. The applicant was repre-
sented by Hastings and Prince Edward Legal Services.
175. Minister of National Health and Welfare v. Densmore (June 2, 1993), Appeal: CP
2389 (Pension Appeals Board)[unreported].
176. Ibid. at 3.
177. Supra, note 173 at 6229.
178. R.S.O. 1990, c. L-7, [hereinafter the LTA].
179. S.O. 1992, c. 11. [hereinafter the RCA].
180. R.S.O. 1990, c. R-29, [hereinafter theRRRA].
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rent abatements, although under the RCA this right is somewhat expanded.
Tenants also have the right to apply for an abatement of rent under either
section 94 or section 113 of the LTA. Frequently landlords apply for above
guideline rent increases which are not opposed by tenants. Some courts have
declared that the tenant's failure to make a case for an abatement in the former
administrative process renders the matter res judicata in subsequent judicial
proceedings under the LTA.181
However, in Re Bleszynski and Admann International Trade Inc. 182 the Divi-
sional Court gave consideration to this issue. The lower court had held that
certain orders made by the Rent Review Hearings Board (in which the tenants
had raised allegations of non-repair) estopped the tenants from seeking an
order under the LTA on the same evidence. The Divisional Court noted that the
remedial powers available under the RRRA and the LTA were quite different,
with the powers under the LTA being much broader. It found that it would be
unfair to prevent a tenant from seeking relief under one of the Acts if the
remedy granted under the other Act had not provided adequate compensation.
The court concluded:
...we are of the opinion that there is not necessarily a situation of resjudicata
or estoppel when matters are raised before the Rent Review Hearings Board
which could also be the subject of an application under section 96 [now
section 94, ed.] of the Landlord and Tenant Act.183
Another significant decision under the rent control regime is Re Tenants of the
Grenadier and We-Care Retirement Homes.184 This case deals with the
exemption of accommodation occupied by a person "for the purpose of receiv-
ing care" from the definition of "residential premises" in the RRRA. The
identical provision is contained in the LTA. Therefore, the case will also be
relevant under that legislation.
181. This type of ruling undermines a tenant's broad range of remedies under the LTA.
Since one of the main purposes for the 1969 amendments to the LTA was to guaran-
tee tenant's s. 94 rights (landlord's responsibility to repair) the application of res
judicata significantly undermines the ability to rely on that remedial legislation.
182. (August 4, 1993), #643 and 644/92 (Ontario Court (General Division) Divisional
Court) [unreported]; sub nom Re Tutzakow and Admann International Trade Inc.
The case arose under the RRRA. The tenants were represented by Parkdale Commu-
nity Legal Services.
183. Ibid. at 6-7. Unfortunately the Divisional Court went on to conclude that the orders
under the RRRA had dealt with all the tenants' complaints. Implicit in that conclu-
sion was the fact that they had already been fully compensated by those orders.
184. (July 6, 1993), Toronto # 717/91 (Ont. Div. Ct.) [unreported]. The tenants were rep-
resented by the Advocacy Centre for the Elderly.
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The landlord claimed the premises were exempt from rent review because it
was a care facility for senior citizens. Many of the occupants receive no care
or minimal care. The Divisional Court stated:
... it is surely not the case that any receipt of care, however insignificant in
amount and however far removed in nature from medical or nursing care,
can take the premises out of rent review. To hold this would create a vast
opportunity for evasion of rent review. The legislature must have intended
that the receipt of care be more than merely incidental to occupancy of the
premises. 185
The Court held that the use of the words "the purpose" supported the
view that it was the intent of the legislature to require that the care be the
primary reason why the occupant was occupying the particular accommo-
dation. 186 The Court also stated that to find that these premises were
exempt would be
...to establish a class of accommodation, inevitably catering primarily to the
elderly, in which neither cost nor quality would be regulated. Given the
complex statutory framework establishing Ontario's regime for the care of the
elderly, this result would be an anomalous one... 18 7
2. Co-operatives
A second legislative enactment which will have impact on housing issues is
the Co-operative Statute Law Amendment Act.18 8 This legislation provides
certain procedural safeguards to member occupants in non-profit co-operative
housing. The procedural provisions mirror those in the LTA. This legislation
has extended the common law and statutory rights of member occupants in
185. Ibid. at 1-2.
186. Ibid. at 4. The Court noted that the view it took in this case is contrary to the view
taken in Keith Whitney Homes Society v Payne (1992), 9 O.R. (3d) 186 (O.C.J.).
Payne is presently under appeal to the Divisional Court. That decision had held that
the premises were exempt from the eqivalent provision of the LTA because "a pur-
pose'', rather than "the primary purpose", of the accommodation was rehabilitation.
The primary purpose test has also been used under the LTA in Re Foster and
Lewkowicz (1993), 14 O.R. (3d) 339 (O.C.J.). Lewkowicz dealt with an exemption
from the definition of "residential premises" in s. 1 of the LTA for "tourist homes".
187. Ibid. at 4. While Charter issues were raised on the appeal, they were not dealt with.
The Court's acknowledgement of the interests of the elderly comes as close to a
consideration of Charter interests as the reasons get. The Court notes that this
accommodation impacts on the elderly and uses this as a further basis for its inter-
pretation of the statutory provision.
188. S.O. 1992, c. 19. Hereinafter the CSLAA. This was proclaimed in force in August
of 1992.
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non-profit co-operative housing. The amendment has expressly excluded non-
profit co-ops from the provisions of the LTA.
While there are not, at present, any decisions under the CSLAA, there are two
decisions which will be relevant to determinations under this legislation. In
York Condominium Corporation No. 382 v Dvorchik189 the Court held that a
rule of the condominium corporation prohibiting occupants from having large
dogs was unreasonable. The Condominium Act 190 requires that rules be rea-
sonable. In Re Optimism Place Second Stage Residences and Edwards 91 the
Court held that given the nature of the residence, (i.e., an emergency shelter),
the staff must have known it would have to deal with abuse from abused and
dysfunctional children. Therefore, it could not seek to evict for those reasons
alone.
Similarly, the CSLAA permits termination where the occupant breaches
grounds set out in the by-laws, although these grounds must not be "unreason-
able or arbitrary".192 The reasoning of the Court in Dvorchik and in Edwards
is certainly applicable to a determination of what is reasonable grounds for the
purpose of the CSLAA.
3. Human Rights Code193
In Re Browne and Knights Village Non-Profit Homes Inc.194 the Court appears
to have accepted that it had jurisdiction to entertain whether a qualification for
occupation in subsidized housing violated the Ontario Human Rights Code. In
that particular case it found that the requirement that the tenant have custody
of three children to occupy a three bedroom unit did not consititute discrimi-
nation on the basis of family status. Otherwise, the decision is of limited
application since it dealt with the interpretation of the term "custody" as used
in a settlement agreement reached by the parties in the LTA dispute.
4. The Charter of Rights
The decision of the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal in Sparks vDartmouth/Hal-
ifax County Regional Housing Authority'95 is also relevant to the LTA. The
189. (1992), 24 R.P.R. (2d) 19 (O.C.J.).
190. R.S.O. 1990, c. C-26, section 29.
191. [1992] O.J. No. 1832 (O.C.J.) (QL).
192. Supra, note 188, section 171.8(2)2.
193. R.S.O. 1990, c. H-19.
194. (1992), 60 O.A.C. 155 (Div. Ct.), leave to appeal to Court of Appeal denied March
1993.
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legislation in question in Sparks was not saved under s. 1 of the Charter as it
was held that there was no reasonable basis for the differential treatment. The
rights of subsidized tenants were not impaired as little as possible. In this
regard the Court specifically referred to the Ontario Landlord and TenantAct
provisions dealing with subsidized tenants. 196 It determined that subsidized
tenants in Ontario had far greater equality of treatment with other tenants. It
found that the limited differential treatment accorded subsidized tenants in
Ontario was reasonable and justifiable given the purpose of housing subsidies.
While this determination regarding the Charter implications of the Ontario
provisions was obiter, the decision would likely provide a substantial
barrier to a Charter attack on the Ontario provisions relating to subsidized
tenants. Regardless, the decision may well be applied to tenants in general
where they are subjected to differential treatment at the hands of public
authorities: e.g., public utilities. It would be necessary to establish that
historically disadvantaged groups tend to be disproportionally represented
in the tenant population.
Another Charter decision of interest wasA & L Investments Ltd. v Ontario.197
This was a motion by the Crown to strike out a claim by landlords that the
RRRA violated their s. 7 and s. 15 Charter rights. The Court held that the
landlord's interests were purely proprietory and economic and that there
was no basis for a claim for damages based on an infringement of their s. 7
Charter rights.198 The Court also held that landlords do not constitute a
discrete and insular minority who have traditionally been discriminated
against. The claim for damages based on s. 15 of the Charter was also struck. 199
The Court permitted certain of the landlords to proceed to trial on other
grounds. It held that those landlords who had received conditional, partial or
final orders had vested property rights which were subsequently taken away
retroactively by legislation which amended the RRRA and which became
effective on October 1, 1990.200
195. Infra., note 226. For a discussion of this case see Section E. The Constitution,
Human Rights and Poverty Law.
196. Supra, note 178. The Court would appear to be referring to sections 89, 107 and 110
of the Act.
197. (1993), 13 O.R. (3d) 799 (O.C.J.).
198. Ibid. at 817-819.
199. Ibid. at 819-822.
200. Ibid. at 822-823.
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5. The Rules of Civil Procedure20 1 and the Landlord and Tenant Act
There has long been a debate as to applicability of the Rules of Civil Procedure
(or their precursor, the Rules of Practice) to LTA proceedings. Some courts
have held that the LTA procedural provisions are not exhaustive. 20 2 Regretta-
bly, in McBride v Comfort Living Housing Co-operative Inc.203 the Court of
Appeal stated unequivocally that Part IV of the LTA was a "not only com-
prehensive, but exhaustive" code of procedure for residential premises. 204
This decision makes any argument that in some circumstances the Rules may
apply a difficult one. However, since this decision, the Rules have been
amended and now specifically refer to LTA proceedings. 2°5 In Re Lakeshore
Limited Partnership and Piepryzyk2° 6 the Court considered whether a judge
could set aside the default order of another judge in an LTA proceeding. The
Court concluded that there was nothing in the Rules or the LTA to preclude the
application of rule 38.12 (setting aside default judgments) to the case before it.
The Court stated:
This is not to open the flood gates to import into the summary proceedings
under Part IV of the Landlord and Tenant Act the whole of the machinery of
the Rules of Civil Procedure.2 07
It would therefore appear that, provided the Rule in question does not conflict
with a specific procedural provision in the LTA and is consistent with the
remedial, summary and expeditious nature of that legislation, there is no
reason why it should not be applicable in an LTA proceeding.
6. Abatement of rent
A number of decisions have-been relying on the decision in Re Herbold and
Pajelle Investments Ltd. 208 to limit the abatement remedy. This trend is dis-
201. R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194.
202. This should be readily apparent from a review of the legislation itself. For example,
while some procedural provisions exist for section 113 applications, there are no
procedural provisions at all for section 94 applications.
203. (1992), 7 O.R. (3d) 394 (C.A.).
204. Ibid. at 400. However, the Court was not expressly addressing the issue of the appli-
cability of the Rules to LTA proceedings. The Court determined that because co-ops
were at the time exempted by regulation from the definition of residential premises
in s. 1 of the LTA, not only did Part IV not apply but no other Part of the LTA could
apply either.
205. 0. Reg. 175/92. Now see Rule 38.04.
206. (September 30, 1992), Toronto #92-LT-040305 (O.C.J.) [unreported].
207. Ibid. at 14.
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turbing since those courts are applying Herbold in a manner that, arguably,
was not intended by the Court. In Herbold the Court stated:
...only in the most exceptional circumstances [should a court] grant an abatement
for rent because of failure to provide the repairs and services during a short
period required for necessary repairs and renovations...[emphasis added]. 209
This has been misapplied in at least two recent decisions. In Re Casnig and
Jordan210 the court seems to have inteipreted Herbold as stating that abate-
ment is an exceptional remedy. In Re Stephos Management Services and
McGregor2n1 the Court only looked at the period during which repairs were
undertaken but entirely ignored the long duration of the complaint. Abatement
is clearly not an exceptional remedy. Further, while discounting abatement
during the "short period required for necessary repairs" was recommended in
Herbold it was not suggested that the period before repairs were undertaken
should not be subject to the remedy of abatement.
The Herbold principle was applied appropriately in Re Tagwerker and Zaidan
Realty Corp.212 In that case the Court held:
... the amount of the abatement should reflect the gravity of the landlord's
failure and its obvious impact on the diminution of the aggregate benefits
bargained for by the tenants.2 13
This decision was upheld by the Divisional Court.214
7. Punitive or exemplary damages
The issue of the availability of punitive or exemplary damages has been
considered in two recent landlord and tenant applications. In Re 690981
Ontario Ltd. and Park215 the Court awarded $1000 punitive damages against
a landlord who harassed an immigrant single parent tenant who was in arrears
of rent. The Court stated that punitive damages were not normally awarded in
208. [1976] 2 S.C.R. 520 (S.C.C.).
209. Ibid. at 528.
210. (December 17, 1992), Kingston #5101/92 (O.C.J.) [unreported].
211. (May 25, 1993), Ottawa #71674/93 (O.C.J.) [unreported].
212. (1991), 5 O.R. (3d) 129 (O.C.J.).
213. Ibid. at 142.
214. Re Tagwerker and Zaidan Realty Corp. (February 17, 1993) File No. 551/91 (Ont.
Div. Ct.) [unreported].
215. (January 5, 1993), Toronto #92-LT-42153 (O.C.J.) [unreported]. The tenant was
represented by Metro Tenants Legal Services.
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LTA proceedings but may be awarded where the landlord has acted in a
"high-handed and arrogant" manner towards the tenant.216 Similarly, in Re
Zahalan and Dill217 the Court awarded punitive damages of $500 against a
sophisticated landlord who was "wilfully blind" to its responsibilities under
the LTA.
E. THE CONSTITUTION, HUMN RIGHTS AND POVERTY LAW
1. Charter Jurisprudence-General Developments
(a) Poverty as a Ground of Discrimination
In an encouraging development, the Tax Court of Canada has found that
poverty can be a personal characteristic for the purposes of inclusion as an
unenumerated ground of discrimination under section 15 of the Charter,218
and that there is some room for economic rights within the meaning of
"security of the person" contained in section 7 of the Charter.219 Schaff v
Canada220 involved a claim by a custodial parent that the taxation of child
support payments violated both section 7 and 15.
The claim was ultimately unsuccessful. In regard to section 15, the court found
that a poor, single, female divorced parent was part of a discrete and insular
minority, and that poverty was a "personal characteristic that can form the
basis of discrimination". 221 However, the court concluded that the impugned
section of the Income Tax Act did not have a discriminatory effect on the
appellant. The court's reasoning turned on the view that it should be possible,
in obtaining child support, to have the amount of support increased to recog-
nise the fact that it is taxable.222
216. Ibid. at 12.
217. (December 2, 1992), Ottawa (O.C.J.) [unreported].
218. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Ac 1982,
being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c.11 [hereinafter the Char-
ter]. Section 15 provides:
15(1) Every individual is equal before and under the law and has the right to the
equal protection and equal benefit of the law without discrimination and, in particu-
lar, without discrimination based on race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion,
sex, age or mental or physical disability.
219. Section 7 provides:
Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of the person and the right not to
be deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice.
220. (August 5, 1993), Action No. 92-1054(I'1) (T.C.C.) [unreported].
221. Ibid. at 16.
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In regard to the application of section 7, the court relied on the reasoning in
Irwin Toy Ltd. v. Quebec223 for the proposition that security of the person can
have an economic component. 224 However, the court stated that the economic
component must be related to "the necessaries fundamental to human life or
survival within the spirit of section 7".225 Since the appellant had not claimed
that her access to necessaries was jeopardised, the court concluded that the
provision did not breach section 7.
Schaff is potentially a very useful precedent for cases involving social welfare
programs, which by their nature usually involve circumstances beyond the
control of the individual and concern the necessaries of life.
(b) Public Housing Tenants
Another reason for optimism is the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal's decision in
Sparks v. Dartmouth Housing Authority.2 26 In the course of its judgement, the
court revisited a Charter section 15 issue which it had determined in its own
earlier decision in Bernard vDartmouth HousingAuthority.227 In Bernard, the
court had held that there was no evidence that differential treatment between
tenants in public housing and tenants in private housing was discriminatory.
The court was willing to reconsider the issue because Bernard had been
decided before the Supreme Court of Canada's judgments in Andrews v Law
Society of British Columbia228 and R v Turpin.22 9 Further, the court was
concerned that in Bernard evidence of discrimination had been seriously
lacking, while in Sparks "the appellant adduced a substantial body of evidence
222. Ibid. at 17.
223. [1989] 1 S.C.R. 927 (S.C.C.).
224. Ibid. at 1003-1004.
225. Supra, note 220 at 25.
226. (March 2, 1993), SCA # 02681 (N.S.C.A.) [unreported]. Sparks vDartmouth Hous-
ing Authority (1992), 112 N.S.R.(2d) 197 (N.S. Co. Ct.) was a Nova Scotia County
Court decision which considered a section 15 challenge to certain provisions of
Nova Scotia's Residential Tenancies Act. The provisions exclude the tenants of
public housing from the notice provisions in the Act. Counsel for the tenant
argued that public housing tenants are disproportionately made up of black sin-
gle mothers, and that statutory provisions that work to their detriment constitute
constructive discrimination on the ground of race, family status and receipt of
social assistance. The court denied the application. See Ellsworth & Morrison
(1992) at 47.
227. (1988), 88 N.S.R. (2d) 190 (N.S.CA). The trial court inSparks had followed this decision.
228. [1989] 1 S.C.R. 43 (S.C.C.).
229. [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1296 (S.C.C.).
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at trial relating to the composition of the group of public housing tenants and
the social condition of this group as related to their housing needs".23 0
The approach of the court in Sparks is unusually realistic, (as opposed to
legalistic) when compared with the bulk of section 15 jurisprudence. With a
minimum of discussion, the court considered the makeup of the public-
housing group (predominately people of colour, sole-support mothers, elderly
or disabled people), and the disadvantage that the legislation imposed on
public-housing tenants (and thus on people of colour, sole-support mothers,
elderly or disabled people).231
The Court opined that it was not necessary to view this treatment as construc-
tive discrimination. It was willing to look beyond the description of the group
in question as "public housing tenants" and to acknowledge who the tenants
were. It therefore concluded that the statutory provision in question was not
"neutral on its face" and violated section 15. The court stated:
The content of the law and its impact on public housing tenants is not only
that they are treated differently but the difference relates to the personal
characteristics of the public housing tenant group. To come to any other
conclusion is to close one's eyes to the makeup of the public housing tenancy
group and the effect on them of the exempting sections. 232
The court also held that the legislation was not saved under section 1 of the
Charter as there was no reasonable basis for the differential treatment. The
rights of subsidized tenants were not impaired as little as possible.233
2. Social Welfare Programs and the Charter
Unfortunately, direct Charter challenges involving income maintenance and
social welfare schemes have not been so successful. In Egan and Nesbit v
Canada,234 the appellants sought a declaration that the definition of "spouse"
contained in the Old Age Security Act235 offends section 15 of the Charter
because it excludes same-sex spouses from spousal benefits. The majority
230. Supra, note 226 at 9.
231. Ibid. at 12-14.
232. Ibid. at 14.
233. Ibid. at 18. Section 1 of the Charter provides:
1. The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees the rights and free-
doms set out in it subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be
demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.
234. (1993), 153 N.R. 161 (F.C.A.).
235. R.S.C. 1985, c. 0-9, as amended.
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allowed that sexual orientation could be an analogous ground of discrimina-
tion for the purpose of section 15,236 but dismissed the appeal, concluding that
the definition was not discriminatory. While the majority judgement in Egan is
incoherent, it would appear that there were four reasons for the result reached.
First, the majority took the view that, because the Supreme Court in Andrews
had rejected the notion that the "similarly situated" test was the relevant test in
establishing discrimination, no comparative analysis could be made.23 7 This
unnecessarily restrictive approach enabled the court to ignore the relevance of
the trial judge's finding that, had this been a heterosexual couple, the spousal
allowance would have been granted.23 8
Secondly, the court focused on the statement in Andrews that a person
should not be deprived of a benefit because of a distinction based on
irrelevant personal differences. Astonishingly, the court inferred from that
statement that there is a "legal requirement that a distinction be based on an
irrelevant personal difference" in order for discrimination to be established.
The court concluded that this "requirement" precluded a finding of discrim-
ination in this case because sexual orientation was highly relevant to the
appellant's claim. 239
Thirdly, the court took the view that because other groups were excluded, such
as unrelated housemates and brothers and sisters who lived together, the
exclusion was not discriminatory.240 However, the response to this argument
can be found in the dissenting opinion of Linden J.A. who stated:
...it is no answer to a charge of discrimination to say that admitting one group
to the benefits program would leave another unjustly excluded. To use...(this
possibility)...as a basis for denying the equality claim of gay men and lesbians
would be, to quote the Supreme Court, "equality with a vengeance"...The
better solution is to address the claim before the Court, leaving other groups
or individuals...to advance their own claims...and to deal with them on their
own merits in due course.241
236. Supra, note 234 at 167.
237. Ibid. at 175.
238. In dissent, Linden L.A. pointed out that comparative analysis remains a part of the
exercise in establishing discrimination under s.15, citing not only Andrews, but R. v.
Swain (1991) 63 C.C.C. (3d) 481 (S.C.C.), Rudolf Wolff & Co. v. Canada [1990] 1
S.C.R. 695,R vHess;R vNguyen [1990] 2 S.C.R. 906. SeeEgan at 199-200.
239. Ibid. at 175.
240. Ibid. at 178-179.
241. Ibid. at 198. The "equality with a vengeance" quote comes from Schachter v Can-
ada (1992), 93 D.L.R. (4th) 1 (S.C.C.).
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Finally, the court made findings concerning the purpose of the legislation.
Since there was no need to refer to section 1, it is not clear why it did so.
Possibly it was an attempt to respond to an argument that the legislation
deliberately discriminated on the basis of sexual orientation. The court
accepted that the objective of the legislation was to ameliorate the severe cut
in income experienced by one-"breadwinner" couples, where the breadwinner
becomes eligible for a pension before the other spouse. The evidence as to
legislative intention that was placed before the court clearly contemplated
"traditional" heterosexual marriages in which the wife was younger than the
husband. 242 If, however, the purpose of the review of legislative objective was
to respond to an argument of intentional discrimination, it is notable that the
court failed to address the relevance of an argument that same-sex couples
might find themselves in exactly the same situation as that which the legisla-
tion purports to address.
In Conrad v County of Halifax, 43 the Nova Scotia Supreme Court briefly
considered, and dismissed, an argument that the termination of welfare bene-
fits without notice or an opportunity for a hearing breached section 7 of the
Charter. Assistance for the claimant and her children had been cut off after a
neighbour had reported that the claimant's husband was living with her.
Significantly, once the claimant appealed this decision, it was reexamined and
reversed by the county social assistance authority without the need for a
hearing. The claimant also subsequently qualified for assistance from the
provincial authority as a single mother. However, counsel brought the matter
of the termination procedure before the court.
The court cited the egregious Brown v. British Columbia (Minister of
Health),244 and Irwin Toy245 as support for its view that "purely property and
economic interests have not yet been protected by the courts" under section
7.246 Finally, the court found in obiter that the process by which the plaintiff's
242. Ibid. at 181. The evidence also focused on the plight of the spouse, usually female,
who has eschewed the financial security of paid employment to fulfil domestic
duties, while failing to acknowledge that the spousal allowance is payable regardless
of previous employment or need.
243. (Aug 11, 1993), C.H. No. 70286 [unreported].
244. (1990), 66 D.L.R. (4th) 444 (B.C.S.C.).
245. Supra, note 223.
246. Supra, note 26 at 31. No mention was made of the fact that in Irwin Toy the
Supreme Court of Canada recognised that not all economic interests are the same,
and that economic interests "fundamental to human life or survival" may be subject
to Charter protection. See also the discussion of Sparks, above.
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welfare benefits were terminated was fair and did not violate the principles of
fundamental justice.247
While the Conrad decision is not to be recommended as a thoughtful study of
the law, it is illustrative of an attitude that is common, at least among the lower
courts, to welfare recipients. What was at issue at the trial was whether the
procedure by which assistance was terminated breached section 7. However, the
result in Conrad appears to stem in large part from the judge's finding that the
plaintiff was lying about her eligibility for assistance, despite the fact that the
both the municipal and the provincial social assistance authorities apparently
considered her eligible. The openly hostile remarks of the judge include a
criticism of the plaintiff's "legalistic" attitude, she having had the temerity
to go to court instead of having her case handled "in a non-adversarial
fashion in accordance with established social work procedures".248
3. Developments in Human Rights Law
(a) Gay and Lesbian Rights
In Clinton v Ontario Blue Cross249 the complainant had applied to have her
same-sex partner recognised as a common law spouse for the purposes of her
employer's group benefit plan. The respondents (the insurer and employer)
stated that the plan did not allow for same-sex partners to receive benefits.
They argued that they were permitted to discriminate against the complainant
on the basis of her "marital status" pursuant to section 25(2) of the Human
Rights Code.2-50 However, the complainant argued that the respondents'
discrimination was on the basis of her sexual orientation, and was thus not
exempted by section 25.
The board in Clinton applied the broad and purposive approach to the interpre-
tation of human rights legislation that the Supreme Court of Canada has urged
in numerous cases. The board decided that section 25(2) should not be inter-
preted to allow employers and their insurers to deny spousal benefits to
same-sex spouses.
247. Ibid. at 32-33.
248. Ibid. at 23.
249. (July 19, 1993) Ont. Bd of Inquiry [unreported].
250. R.S.O. 1990, c. H-19. Section 25 provides, inter alia, that the right to equal treat-
ment with respect to employment without discrimination because of age, sex, mari-
tal status or family status is not infringed by a contract of group insurance between
the employer and an insurer that complies with the Employment Standards Act and
its regulations.
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The board pointed out that the term "marital status" as defined in the Code
appears specifically to exclude same sex spouses, and has certainly been
interpreted to do so. Having been interpreted exclusively to deny rights it
could not be interpreted inclusively for the same purpose.25 1 Instead the board
agreed with the complainant that the discrimination was on the basis of sexual
orientation. Accordingly, the board ruled that the complainant did not need to
turn to the Charter for protection.252
(b) Disabled Persons' Rights
There have been two recent decisions with major implications for the disabled
community; one concerning the right to access to buildings and the other on
the right to individual assessment before employment decisions are made.
In Elliot v Epp CentresLtd253 the complainant had a mobility disability which
required the use of a wheelchair and a specially equipped van. On arrival at a
shopping mall, where she intended to go to a restaurant, she could not find a
parking space wide enough to accommodate her van, nor a ramp for her
wheelchair. She parked near the mall's entrance, but was told to leave by an
employee.
At the hearing, the respondent argued that the buildings in question were in
conformity with the Ontario Building Code, and that installing "handicapped
parking" would cause him to be in non-compliance with his site plan and with
municipal bylaws. Citing both Supreme Court of Canada jurisprudence and a
legislative provision that gives the Human Rights Code paramountcy over
existing provincial legislation, the board ruled that this was not a defence. The
respondent was ordered to provide "handicapped parking", construct a wheel-
chair ramp, and pay the complainant $1000 for loss of the right to be free from
discrimination.
251. Supra, note 249 at 12. Such an interpretation was first made in a separate concurring
judgement by Brettel Dawson, one of the three adjudicators in Leshner v Ontario
(No.2), (1992) 16 C.H.R.R. D/184. Professor Dawson disagreed with the majority's
view that the s. 25(2) of the Code provided an exception that allowed the Ontario
government to refuse pension benefits to same-sex spouses, and therefore was con-
trary to the Charter. She held that s. 25(2) did not operate to bar same-sex spouses
from inclusion. For a discussion of the Leshner decision see Ellsworth & Morrison
(1992) at 44-45.
252. Ibid. at 16. Since interpretation of the Charter was not at issue in Clinton, the board
did not feel compelled to apply Egan and Nesbit v Canada, supra note 234.
253. (June 27, 1993), Ont. Rd. of Inquiry [unreported]. The complainant was represented
by Niagara North Community Legal Assistance.
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Thwaites v Canadian Armed Forces254 concerned a member of the naval
service who was discharged because of the Force's assumption that
someone infected with HIV would be unfit for service. The board of
inquiry found that the Canadian Human Rights Act 255 had been
breached. The decision contains an interesting review of the progression
of caselaw on the issue of risk as it relates to the "reasonable and bona
fide" defence. The board concluded that there is a concept of "tolerable
risks" within the workplace and that the analysis of that risk must be
employment-specific. There is also an examination of the requirement
for employers to assess each case individually, rather than making blan-
ket rules concerning various disabilities. The board ruled that the
employer had a duty to inquire about the facts of the complainant's
medical situation, assess it in relation to the actual job requirements, and
consider reasonable accommodation.
Advocates who are considering a discrimination argument in a particu-
lar poverty law case will need to give some thought to the utility of a
discrimination argument under federal or provincial human rights legis-
lation, as well as under the Charter. This is particularly important where
the Ontario Human Rights Code would be applicable, since the Code has
a clause that overrides other provincial legislation.2 56 In terms of forum,
it is arguable that human rights legislation can, and indeed must, be
considered and applied by courts and tribunals deciding issues with
respect to income maintenance, social insurance and landlord and tenant
law, as well as by tribunals appointed under human rights legislation.25 7
The interpretative approach fostered by the Supreme Court of Canada
and taken in Leshner and in Clinton, if adopted by other tribunals, could
produce worthwhile results.
(c) Minimum Income Requirements in Rental Accommodation
For decades, Ontario landlords have felt free to refuse accommodation to
prospective tenants on the ground that the source of the tenant's income is
social assistance.258 Often, the refusal is blatant; "we don't rent to people
254. (June 7, 1993) Can. Human Rights Trib. [unreported].
255. R.S.C. 1985, c. H-6, as amended.
256. Supra, note 250, section 47(2); cited in Elliot, supra, note 253.
257. See Keene, Human Rights In Ontario, (2d ed.) (Toronto: Carswell, 1992), at 267-
269; OSSTF v Haldimand Bd2 of Education (1991), 6 Admin. L.R. (2d) 177 (Ont.
Div. Ct.); and Re ONA and Etobicoke General Hospital and Craven (June 4, 1993),
Action No. 570/92 (Ont. Div. Ct.) [unreported].
258. Although this situation most commonly arises with social assistance recipients, it
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on welfare". In other circumstances, landlords set minimum income require-
ments that cannot be met by people on social assistance.
Since 1982, the Code has prohibited such discrimination in accommoda-
tion on the ground of receipt of public assistance. In addition, the
existence of the Code's provisions on indirect discrimination and con-
structive discrimination clearly render exclusionary income require-
ments a prima facie breach of the legislation. 259 In Willis v David
Anthony Phillips Properties,26 0 an Ontario board of inquiry held that a
landlord's refusal to rent because the prospective tenant was on Family
Benefits contravened the Code.
Despite the relative clarity of the law on this point, there has been a
problem getting complaints involving minimum income requirements
through the Human Rights Commission's investigative and deliberative
processes and on to boards of inquiry. This was true even when the imposi-
tion of minimum income requirements was coupled with blatant refusal to
rent to people on welfare. In part, the problem was due to difficulties
common to all complaints and arising from the backlogged investigative
and settlement process. However, part of the difficulty seemed to stem from
a reluctance on the part of the Commission to refer these complaints for
hearings. The Commission appeared to have some difficulty with the idea
of enforcing the law in this area. This appearance was reinforced by the
Commission's tactic of organizing a series of "consultation meetings at
which the concerns of the various players can be aired and policies exam-
ined" 261 in the summer of 1992, at a point in time when a number of
investigated cases awaited board referrals.
Finally, in February, 1993 the Commission released a "Position Statement" on
minimum income criteria.262 The Statement declares that the practice of
requiring that rental payments not exceed 30% of an applicant's income
discriminates against people receiving social assistance, younger people,
women and the elderly. The Statement also indicates that the Commission
can also affect recipients of other statutory benefit programs such as unemployment
insurance or Canada Pension Plan pensions.
259. Supra, note 250, sections 9 and 11 respectively.
260. (1987), 8 C.H.R.R. D/3847.
261. Letter from Ontario Human Rights Commission, dated August 24, 1992, to Judith
Keene, Clinic Resource Office.
262. Ontario Human Rights Commission, Position Statement The Minimum Income Cri-
terion (February, 1993).
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"does not view credit checks, credit references, rental history or guarantors as
apprbpriate alternatives". 263 The Commission has also referred four cases to
boards of inquiry.
(d) Employment Equity
Bill 79 finally received second reading in July, 1993, and a draft Regulation
has been circulated.264 As noted in last year's review, the Bill itself is disap-
pointing, and the draft Regulation does little to augment it. Public hearings
began in August, 1993 before the Standing Committee on Administration of
Justice.
F. CONCLUSIONS
Even given the expanded scope of this year's article, there remain many issues
which we have not been able to cover. These include Ontario's Fair Tax
Commission265, the failure of the Constitutional Accord,266 the alleged rein-
statement of the Court Challenges Program267 and the progress of the Advo-
cacy Act, 1992.268 While none of these were directly relevant to the practice of
poverty law, they were of tangential importance, and all were the subject of
varying degrees of activism by advocates.
263. Ibid.
264. For a discussion of Bill 79, see Ellsworth & Morrison (1992) at 51-52.
265. The Ontario Fair Tax Commission released its discussion paper entitled Searching
For Fairness in the winter of 1993. The paper deals with many issues of concern
around taxation and tax policy, including the effects on low income earners and
social assistance recipients. The Commission held hearings across the province in
April, May and June to allow interested people to make comments on the discussion
paper prior to the preparation of its final report. The final report is expected by the
end of 1993.
266. The Charlottetown constitutional Accord was repudiated in a referendum held on
October 26, 1993. The Accord contained the "Social Charter" which was discussed
in last years article; see Ellsworth & Morrison (1992) at 49-50. Constitutional dis-
cussions passed quickly from the agenda after the Accord's defeat.
267. In a pre-election announcement the Prime Minister stated that the Court Challenges
Program would be reinstated at its previous funding level. However, this announce-
ment came from the same person who was Justice Minister when the program was
cancelled, and publicly defended the decision. For a discussion, see Ellsworth &
Morrison (1992) at 6.
268. S.O. 1992 c. 26. This Act along with the Substitute Decisions Act, 1992, S.O. 1992
c. 30, the Consent to Treatment Act, 1992, S.O. 1992 c. 32 and the Consent and
Capacity Statute Law Amendment Act, 1992, S.O. 1992 c. 33. are to provide a coor-
dinated system of rights to ensure that people with disabilities and other vulnerable
people have ways of finding out what their rights are and how to exercise them. For
a discussion of these statutes see 1OArchType No. 5 at 21-23 and No. 6 at 22-24.
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Our conclusions this year can be little more than a reiteration of those of the
previous years. To paraphrase the President of the United States, "its the stupid
economy". Clearly, nothing can be expected to improve until the reces-
sion/depression has run its course. However, we have noted where things have
gotten or are getting worse. Social programs are under attack from a diverse
number of forces. Advocates and their clients have had to argue their case, not
just to the bureaucrats and tribunals who are responsible for decision-making
under the various social welfare schemes, but to the politicians, media and
public at large. At times its seems that even our allies of yesterday have taken
up arms against us.
The work however does and must go on. The rewards are few, and at times
fleeting. They are a testament to the many hard-working people engaged in the
task. It is from their limited successes today through which the hope of
tomorrow is fostered.
